Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Seriously in Criminal Cases after \u3ci\u3eMorrison\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eKiobel\u3c/i\u3e by Keenan, David & Schroff, Sabrina P.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 45
Issue 1 2013 Fall Article 2
2013
Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Seriously in Criminal Cases afterMorrison and
Kiobel
David Keenan
Sabrina P. Schroff
Southern District of New York
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Keenan, & Sabrina P. Schroff, Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Seriously in Criminal Cases after Morrison and
Kiobel, 45 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 71 (2013).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol45/iss1/2
TAKING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY SERIOUSLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/13/2014 1:16 PM 
 
71 
Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Seriously in Criminal Cases after Morrison and 
Kiobel 
 
David Keenan and Sabrina P. Shroff* 
In two recent decisions, Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. 
Ct. 2869 (2010), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013), the Supreme Court emphatically reaffirmed the longstanding 
presumption that federal statutes do not apply outside the territorial 
United States absent a “clear indication” to the contrary.  Although 
Morrison and Kiobel involved civil suits under section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act and the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) 
respectively, this Article contends that the Court’s holdings ought to 
similarly restrict the extraterritorial application of federal criminal law.  
That is because Morrison and Kiobel instruct courts on how they should 
interpret the reach of statutes generally—not just civil ones like section 
10(b) and the ATS.  Consequently, a host of criminal laws that 
prosecutors have routinely applied extraterritorially in the past, but 
whose geographic scope is facially ambiguous, ought to be 
reinterpreted as reaching domestic conduct only.  Such statutes 
encompass not just securities fraud, but conduct as varied and 
significant as antitrust violations, racketeering, drug trafficking, mail 
fraud, and weapons possession. 
 
 
 
 
 
* David Keenan received his J.D. from Yale Law School and will begin a clerkship with the 
Honorable Paul G. Gardephe in November 2013.  Sabrina P. Shroff is an Assistant Federal 
Defender in the Southern District of New York who has represented several foreign nationals 
charged with extraterritorial offenses.  Our work on behalf of two of those clients, Paul 
Mardirossian and Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed, helped inform this Article.  We wish to thank Fiona 
Doherty, Arthur Ewenczyk, Daniel Hemel, Katie Kaplan, Doug Lieb, David McNamee, David 
Patton, Kate Stith, Danielle Rosenthal, and Alex Roth.  We also would like to express our 
gratitude to the editors of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their editorial 
assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank.1  Practitioners and academics quickly hailed the decision as a 
landmark ruling in the Court’s securities law,2 jurisdictional,3 and 
statutory interpretation4 jurisprudence.  Morrison applied the 
 
1. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
2. See, e.g., Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation After Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance Based Approach to Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 249, 250 (2012) (describing Morrison as a “momentous decision” that “upend[ed] decades of 
federal appeals court precedent in transnational securities law”); Luke Green, Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank – The Dawn of a New Age?, ISS GOVERNANCE: INSIGHT: SECURITIES 
LITIGATION (June 25, 2010, 5:54 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2010/06/morrison-v-
national-australia-bank-the-dawn-of-a-new-age.html (calling the decision “ground breaking”); 
Richard Hans & Anthony D. Gill, Landmark Morrison Ruling: Supreme Court Rejects  
Extraterritorial Application of Securities Exchange Act, DLA PIPER LITIGATION ALERT (June 30, 
2010), http://www.dlapiper.com/landmark-morrison-ruling-supreme-court-rejects-extraterritorial-
application-of-securities-exchange-act/ (dubbing Morrison a “watershed” in securities litigation). 
3. See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1673, 1673 (2012) (recognizing Morrison as a “landmark” decision); Howard M. Wasserman, 
The Demise of Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947, 947 (2011) (describing 
Morrison as one of several “significant constitutional rulings” from the Court’s October 2009 
term that helped clarify the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional rules). 
4. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 687, 687 (2011) 
(characterizing Morrison as “the most important decision construing the geographic scope of a 
statute in almost twenty years”). 
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“longstanding” presumption against extraterritoriality to hold that 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 does not reach 
securities transactions that occur outside the territorial United States.6  
By doing so, the Court—in one fell swoop—overturned decades of 
lower court precedent that had permitted such suits so long as plaintiffs 
adequately alleged deceptive conduct that either occurred in, or had 
substantial effects upon, the United States.7  The decision has already 
had a profound impact on securities-fraud litigation.  In several cases, 
district courts have cited Morrison in dismissing civil suits against 
foreign securities issuers.8  As lead counsel for National Australia Bank 
noted just over a year after Morrison was decided, “[plaintiffs] don’t 
even bother to bring these cases anymore.”9 
This past term, the Court went one step further.  In Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum,10 it relied on Morrison to hold that the Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”)11 does not permit federal courts to recognize a cause of 
action for torts committed by aliens abroad.  Kiobel makes clear the 
 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
6. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law that 
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
244, 248 (1991))). 
7. The so-called “conducts and effects test” was the product of several Second Circuit 
decisions in the late 1960s and early 70s, the most famous of which is Leasco Data Processing 
Equip. Co. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); see also IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 
1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206–08 (2d Cir. 1968), modified on other grounds en 
banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).  To varying degrees, other circuits embraced the Second 
Circuit’s approach.  See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880 (collecting cases).  For blunt criticism of the 
Court’s departure from this long line of precedent, see Lea Brilmayer, The New 
Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the 
Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 655, 655 
(2011) (“Last term, Morrison v. National Australia Bank jettisoned decades of settled law, casting 
doubt on long-accepted practices of statutory construction and instructing the lower courts to turn 
a deaf ear to indications of congressional intent any subtler than the proverbial meat axe.”). 
8. See, e.g., In re Infineon Techs. AG Sec. Litig., No. 04-cv-04156, 2011 WL 7121006, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Morrison does not apply to 
securities that are “dual listed” on foreign and domestic exchanges); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche 
Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding over-the-counter equity-
swap agreements to be “essentially ‘transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets,’ 
and not ‘domestic transactions’ that merit the protection of § 10(b)” (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2882, 2884)); In re Alstom SA Secs. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(rejecting “dual listed” argument); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying Morrison to purchases of foreign securities by American investors). 
9. Alison Frankel, Morrison v. NAB’s 2nd Act: Way Beyond Securities Fraud and RICO, ON 
THE CASE: A THOMSON-REUTERS BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2011/10/17/morrison-v-nabs-2nd-act-way-beyond-securities-fraud-and-rico/. 
10. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
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Court intended Morrison to do more than simply define the substantive 
reach of U.S. securities laws.  Although neither party raised the issue 
below,12 the Justices ordered post-argument supplemental briefing as to 
whether the ATS encompasses extraterritorial conduct.13  Ultimately, 
they held that it did not, even though the ATS is merely a jurisdictional 
statute that “does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief” itself.14  
The Court reasoned that ATS litigation implicated the principles 
underlying the presumption, particularly the desire to avoid 
“unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy.”15  
This Article examines an overlooked aspect of the Court’s renewed 
emphasis on the presumption against extraterritoriality: its potential 
impact on federal criminal law.  Morrison and Kiobel are likely to have 
far-reaching consequences for how courts interpret the substantive reach 
of federal criminal statutes.  That is because both decisions admonish 
lower courts on how they should interpret federal statutes generally—
not just the ATS and section 10(b).  As Justice Scalia succinctly 
explained in Morrison: “When a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”16  The Morrison Court further 
instructed, and Kiobel reiterated, that judges must “apply the 
presumption in all cases” in order to “preserv[e] a stable background 
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”17  
Statutes will not be given extraterritorial effect absent a “clear 
indication” of congressional intent.18  Consequently, in light of 
Morrison and Kiobel, a host of criminal statutes that prosecutors 
routinely applied extraterritorially in the past, but whose geographic 
scope is facially ambiguous, ought to be reinterpreted as reaching 
domestic conduct only.  Such statutes encompass not just securities 
fraud, but conduct as varied and significant as antitrust violations,19 
racketeering,20 drug trafficking,21 mail fraud,22 and weapons 
 
12. Brief for Respondents at 53–55, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) 
(No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 259389, at *53–55. 
13. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (directing parties to submit 
supplemental briefing). 
14. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
15. Id. 
16. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). 
17. Id. at 2881 (emphasis added). 
18. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883). 
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (Sherman Antitrust Act). 
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2012) (RICO).  As is true of violations of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and the Sherman Antitrust Act, violations of RICO can give rise to criminal and civil 
liability.  Compare id. § 1963 (criminal penalties), with id. § 1964 (civil penalties). 
21. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) (Controlled Substances Act). 
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud). 
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possession.23 
The impact of Morrison on criminal cases is already evident.  In 
January 2013, the Ninth Circuit cited Morrison in holding that the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) does not 
apply extraterritorially in a criminal proceeding.24  And this past 
August, the Second Circuit similarly found that a criminal action under 
section 10(b) must satisfy the same requirements as a civil one under 
Morrison, namely that the underlying securities transaction(s) occur 
domestically.25  The court explained: “[T]he general rule is that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to criminal statutes, and 
section 10(b) is no exception.”26  
Notwithstanding these recent decisions, considerable ambiguity 
remains over whether the presumption ought to apply with equal force 
to federal criminal statutes writ large.  That ambiguity stems from 
United States v. Bowman,27 a 1922 Supreme Court case that seems to 
support exempting at least some criminal laws from the presumption 
altogether.  Lower courts, both before and after Morrison, have 
routinely cited Bowman in rejecting efforts to apply the presumption to 
federal criminal statutes.28  Indeed, notwithstanding its recent emphatic 
declaration concerning the presumption’s applicability to section 10(b) 
criminal prosecutions, the Second Circuit had previously asserted—in 
two post-Morrison cases, no less—that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality does not apply at all to criminal matters.29  Moreover, 
 
23. See, e.g., id. § 924(c) (Gun Control Act of 1968). 
24. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2013). 
25. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL 
4608948 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013).  Dodd-Frank has since modified the Securities Exchange Act to 
authorize “extraterritorial jurisdiction” for actions brought by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) or Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  George Conway III, 
the lawyer who represented the Morrison respondents, has argued that Congress’s apparent 
drafting error (i.e., addressing jurisdiction rather than the substantive reach of the statute) should 
invalidate efforts to apply the statute extraterritorially.  See George T. Conway III, 
Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-
after-dodd-frank/; see also Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 207–08 (2011); 
Andrew Rocks, Whoops! The Imminent Reconciliation of U.S. Securities Laws with International 
Comity After Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Drafting Error in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
56 VILL. L. REV. 163, 188–95 (2011).  Regardless of whether one accepts Conway’s argument, it 
is clear that Dodd-Frank does not apply retroactively to conduct that occurred before its passage.  
§ 4, 124 Stat. at 1390. 
26. Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948, at *7. 
27. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
28. See infra Part I.A. 
29. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The ordinary presumption 
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even when courts do apply the presumption, they must confront the 
further difficulty of identifying a principled basis for differentiating 
domestic from extraterritorial criminal conduct. 
This Article aims to help guide scholars, litigants, and courts as they 
approach this unsettled area of the law.  It proceeds in two Parts.  Part I 
offers both an explanation for lower courts’ reluctance to apply the 
presumption in criminal cases and a critique of their (varied) reasoning 
for doing so.  For instance, Part I.A describes how lower courts have 
distorted Bowman’s holding in approving expansive applications of 
U.S. law to acts and persons abroad.  Part I.B examines the primary 
justifications for invoking the presumption and explains how they ought 
to apply with equal force to criminal prosecutions.  Part II looks forward 
to what a more robust application of the presumption in criminal cases 
would look like in practice.  In Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C, we consider 
three statutes that are likely to receive greater scrutiny in the months 
ahead.  Those statutes include the criminal penalty provisions of section 
10(b) and RICO, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which penalizes using, 
carrying, or possessing a firearm during the commission of a drug 
trafficking offense or crime of violence.  As we show, each of these 
statutes merits reinterpretation in light of the Supreme Court’s renewed 
emphasis on the presumption’s role in delimiting the geographic scope 
of facially ambiguous statutes. 
I. AN UNPRINCIPLED DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW 
While Morrison has provided civil defendants with a powerful tool 
for dismissing a variety of private lawsuits,30 lower courts have 
 
that laws do not apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes.”); United States v. 
Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do 
not apply extraterritorially, does not apply to criminal statutes.” (citation omitted)). 
30. See, e.g., Keller Found./Case Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d 835, 844–46 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Morrison in support of holding that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a), does not apply extraterritorially); Cedeno v. Castillo, 457 Fed. App’x 35, 
35 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding, pursuant to Morrison, that RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a 
private civil lawsuit); Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(same, but expressly declining to offer an opinion on whether the statute would reach 
extraterritorial conduct if enforced by the government); see also Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), 
LLC, No. 4:12-cv-345, 2012 WL 2522599, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-20522, 
2013 WL 3742492 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013) (holding that the Dodd-Frank Anti-Retaliation 
Provision does not apply extraterritorially); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 
2012) (finding that RICO does not apply extraterritorially); CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, 
824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1207–10 (D. Colo. 2011) (same); In re Le–Nature’s Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 
WL 2112533, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011) (same); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 
883, 913 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (same); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 
27–28 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-cv-5771, 2011 WL 
843957, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (same).  But see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 
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generally been reluctant to apply its reasoning to criminal 
prosecutions.31  As we seek to show here, such reluctance is unfaithful 
to Morrison’s holding, unfair to criminal defendants, and unwise as a 
matter of policy.  Nothing in the Court’s decision suggests Morrison’s 
logic applies to civil actions only.32  To the contrary, the Court made 
clear that the presumption applies in “all cases.”33  Moreover, the Court 
 
745 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, j. vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (declining to apply Morrison 
and the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute in part because “[t]here is 
no indication in Morrison . . . or elsewhere, that a ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’ existed 
and could have been invoked by Congress in 1789”). 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Sumeru, 449 F. App’x 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the 
defendants’ Morrison claim and distinguishing 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), which prohibits fraudulent 
conduct “in the offer and sale of securities,” from 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), which punishes fraud “in 
connection with the purchase or sale” of securities); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 814 
(11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that Morrison prohibited his conviction for 
weapons possession under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) during an extraterritorial crime of violence 
prohibited by the Torture Act); United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 105 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(rejecting the defendants’ argument that, in light of Morrison, the mail fraud statute—18 U.S.C. § 
1341—cannot be said to reach conduct that occurred in China); United States v. Campbell, 798 F. 
Supp. 2d 293, 303–04 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying an Afghan contractor’s Morrison-based argument 
that the bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), does not apply extraterritorially, despite the 
court’s acknowledgement that “[t]he plain language of § 666 contains no direct or explicit grant 
of extraterritorial application”); United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077, 2011 WL 
7416975, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (concluding that “[e]ven if an extraterritorial analysis 
[were] implicated” in that case, counts alleging violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1952(a)(3), were proper because, under United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), “criminal 
statutes may apply extraterritorially even without an explicit Congressional statement”); United 
States v. Mandell, No. (S1) 09-cr-0662, 2011 WL 924891, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) 
(rejecting the defendants’ motion to dismiss securities fraud charges under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 
78ff, where the alleged fraud involved securities listed on the London Stock Exchange); see also 
United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying Morrison in finding a 
“clear and affirmative indication” that Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), which 
criminalizes travel overseas for the purpose of committing sexual acts with minors, to apply 
extraterritorially, but further noting that under Bowman, “there is reason to doubt that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to § 2423(b) at all”); United States v. Ahmed, No. 
10-cr-131, 2012 WL 983545, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (concluding that Morrison does not 
“change th[e] analysis” of whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) applies extraterritorially and finding that, 
because it is an “ancillary statute,” it has extraterritorial application whenever the underlying 
substantive offense does). 
32. In a footnote to his nonbinding concurrence, Justice Stevens unconvincingly sought to 
limit the Court’s holding to actions brought by private civil litigants.  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n.12 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion does not, 
however, foreclose the [Securities & Exchange] Commission from bringing enforcement actions 
in additional circumstances, as no issue concerning the Commission’s authority is presented by 
this case.  The Commission’s enforcement proceedings not only differ from private § 10(b) 
actions in numerous potentially relevant respects, but they also pose a lesser threat to international 
comity.”).  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did not address Justice Stevens’s concurrence 
directly, but dismissed the comity concern, noting, “[t]he canon . . . or presumption [against 
extraterritoriality] applies regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American 
statute and a foreign law.”  Id. at 2877–78 (majority opinion). 
33. Id. at 2881 (emphasis added). 
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saw its primary task as rendering a definitive construction of section 
10(b)’s text, specifically the words “purchase or sale.”  This observation 
is significant because section 10(b) applies with equal force to both civil 
and criminal securities fraud actions.34  And the Court rejected the 
Solicitor General’s invitation to formulate a test that would exempt 
criminal actions from the ordinary presumption.35 
In fact, there is no compelling justification for a court to give two 
constructions to a single statute—a domestic one for civil actions, and 
an extraterritorial one for criminal prosecutions—based solely on the 
nature of the underlying proceeding.  If anything, the rule of lenity 
suggests criminal defendants ought to receive more generous treatment 
than their civil counterparts.36  From a policy standpoint, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality functions as one of the few 
structural checks against the unbridled exercise of U.S. power.  This is 
so because U.S. courts have repeatedly upheld Congress’s constitutional 
authority to apply its laws extraterritorially,37 while simultaneously 
limiting the scope of foreign defendants’ constitutional rights.38  At a 
 
34. Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act proscribes criminal punishments for anyone who 
“willfully violates” any provision or rule under the Act, including section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).  As the Supreme Court has explained 
in the context of applying the rule of lenity in a civil matter, a statute with civil and criminal 
applications can only have one authoritative meaning.  See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 
n.8 (2004) (“Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its 
application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”). 
35. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 14, 16–17, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191). 
36. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (“[W]hen choice has to be made 
between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we 
choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is 
clear and definite.” (citation omitted)). 
37. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1–7 (2012) (collecting cases); 
see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Both parties concede, as they 
must, that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the 
United States.”); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949) (“The question before us is 
not the power of Congress to extend the eight hour law to work performed in foreign countries.  
Petitioners concede that such power exists.  The question is rather whether Congress intended to 
make the law applicable to such work.”); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d. Cir. 2003) 
(“It is beyond doubt that, as a general proposition, Congress has the authority to enforce its laws 
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (declining to find a Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination where the feared prosecution was foreign rather than 
domestic); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) (finding the defendant 
was not entitled to dismissal or any other constitutional remedy where American law enforcement 
kidnapped him in Mexico and brought him to the United States to stand trial); United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (plurality opinion) (holding the Fourth Amendment 
inapplicable to warrantless searches of foreign nationals outside the territorial United States).  In 
his United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez dissent, Justice Brennan underscored the perverse 
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minimum, Congress should be required to speak clearly when it wishes 
to criminalize extraterritorial conduct or subject foreign nationals to 
American laws. 
Recent developments suggest lower courts’ reluctance to apply 
Morrison’s reasoning to criminal statutes may be waning.  In August, a 
Second Circuit panel concluded, in the context of a section 10(b) 
criminal prosecution, that the presumption against extraterritorially 
“does apply to criminal statutes, except where the law at issue is aimed 
at protecting ‘the right of the government to defend itself.’”39  In similar 
fashion, a Ninth Circuit panel recently applied the presumption to the 
criminal penalty provisions of RICO.40  The court’s decision not only 
recognized Morrison’s applicability in criminal cases,41 but also 
highlighted conflicting interpretations regarding “the ‘focus’ of 
congressional concern” in enacting RICO.42  Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, several lower courts had found that Congress’s focus in 
enacting RICO was on criminal enterprises, as opposed to racketeering 
activities generally.43  Consequently, in order to properly invoke RICO 
 
consequences of exposing foreign nationals to punishment under U.S. laws, on the one hand, 
while denying them the protections of the U.S. Constitution on the other.  494 U.S. at 282 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court today creates an antilogy: the Constitution authorizes our 
Government to enforce our criminal laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise this 
authority, the Fourth Amendment does not travel with them.  This cannot be.  At the very least, 
the Fourth Amendment is an unavoidable correlative of the Government’s power to enforce the 
criminal law.”). 
39.  United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL 
4608948, at *5 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 
(1922)). 
40. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2013). 
41. Id. at 974–75 (“In the wake of Morrison, this circuit has not considered whether RICO 
applies extraterritorially. . . . Other courts that have addressed the issue have uniformly held that 
RICO does not apply extraterritorially. . . . Although those cases addressed the civil rather than 
the criminal RICO statute, they are faithful to Morrison’s rationale . . . .  Therefore, we begin the 
present analysis with a presumption that RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a civil or 
criminal context.”); see also United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(applying Morrison and finding a “clear and affirmative indication” that Congress intended 18 
U.S.C. § 2423(b), which criminalizes travel overseas for the purpose of committing sexual acts 
with minors, to apply extraterritorially, but dismissing one count predicated entirely on 
defendant’s travel between foreign states).  But see United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“The ordinary presumption that laws do not apply extraterritorially has no 
application to criminal statutes.”); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“The presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially, does not apply to 
criminal statutes.”). 
42. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).  In applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to section 10(b), Morrison borrowed this “focus” test from 
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247 (1991) (“Applying the same mode of 
analysis here, we think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the 
deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”). 
43. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 
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in those courts, prosecutors or civil plaintiffs need to prove the 
existence of a domestic criminal enterprise.  The Ninth Circuit, by 
contrast, found the statute’s focus to be on the pattern of racketeering 
activity itself.44  Under this reading, enforcing RICO against a foreign 
enterprise is unobjectionable so long as the alleged racketeering activity 
occurred domestically.45 
These conflicting interpretations illustrate the difficulty courts 
sometimes face when applying Morrison.  But as this Article argues, 
that difficulty is not a reason to avoid the presumption’s application 
altogether, but rather a reminder of the useful role it plays in 
incentivizing Congress to speak with greater clarity in drafting federal 
statutes.  The presumption offers an interpretive aid that allows courts to 
“determine Congress’ intent where Congress likely did not consider the 
matter and where other indicia of intent are in approximate balance.”46 
Before turning to an evaluation of Morrison’s and Kiobel’s potential 
impact on a variety of criminal statutes in Part II, this Part first 
examines why lower courts have heretofore resisted applying the 
presumption in criminal cases.  As we explain, such resistance is both 
inconsistent with Morrison’s and Kiobel’s teachings as well as 
misguided as a matter of logic and policy. 
A. Confronting a Misunderstood Precedent: United States v. 
Bowman 
If the presumption against extraterritoriality really is the 
“longstanding” rule of statutory interpretation that Morrison and Kiobel 
suggest it is, why have lower courts typically avoided applying it when 
 
938–40 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Farm Credit Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Krones, Inc. (In re Le–Nature’s, 
Inc.), No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 n. 7 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011); In re Toyota, 785 F. 
Supp. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-cv-5771, 2011 
WL 84395, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); Cedeno v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Cedeno v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2012). 
44. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 977 (“[A]n inquiry into the application of RICO to Defendants’ 
conduct is best conducted by focusing on the pattern of Defendants’ racketeering activity as 
opposed to the geographic location of Defendants’ enterprise.”). 
45. Id. at 979 (“Defendants’ pattern of racketeering activity may have been conceived and 
planned overseas, but it was executed and perpetuated in the United States. . . . Having 
determined that RICO’s focus is on the pattern of racketeering activity, we conclude that 
Defendants’ criminal plan, which included violation of United States immigration laws while the 
Defendants were in the United States, falls within the ambit of the statute.”).  To complicate 
matters even further, the Second Circuit, while likewise holding that Congress did not intend for 
RICO to apply extraterritorially, has avoided the focus question altogether by simply declaring 
that “slim contacts with the United States” are “insufficient to support extraterritorial 
application.”  Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010). 
46. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 390 (2005). 
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determining the scope of federal criminal laws? 
The answer lies, in part, in an oft-quoted, but frequently 
mischaracterized, passage of a 1922 Supreme Court case, United States 
v. Bowman.47  The defendants in Bowman stood accused of attempting 
to defraud a U.S.-owned corporation on a shipment of oil destined for 
Rio de Janiero.48  None of the alleged criminal activity took place 
within the territorial boundaries of the United States and the statute 
itself was silent as to its extraterritorial effect.49  Still, the Court found 
the defendants’ conduct fell within the statute’s reach.  In so holding, 
the Court began by acknowledging the general principle that Congress 
ordinarily legislates with domestic concerns in mind: 
Crimes against private individuals or their property . . . must of course 
be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government 
where it may properly exercise it.  If punishment of them is to be 
extended outside the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for 
Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the 
purpose of Congress.50 
This statement was consistent with more than one hundred years of 
precedent; as early as 1818, the Court had invoked the presumption in 
holding that the 1790 Crimes Act did not reach a robbery committed by 
foreign nationals aboard a foreign ship while on the high seas.51 
Where Bowman broke new ground, was in holding that certain 
statutes, like those making it a crime to defraud a U.S.-owned entity, 
ought to be given extraterritorial effect to avoid undermining 
Congress’s “purpose” in enacting the statute.52  The Court held that the 
ordinary presumption 
should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not 
logically dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction, 
 
47. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
48. Significantly, the Court declined to reach the thorny issue of whether foreign national 
defendants fell within the statute’s ambit.  Id. at 101. 
49. The provision at issue, section 35 of the U.S. Criminal Code, read in relevant part: 
Whoever shall . . . cause to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any . . . 
corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, any claim upon or 
against the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, or 
any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, knowing such 
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
Act of Oct. 13, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015; Bowman, 260 U.S. at 100 n.1. 
50. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. 
51. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (“[Although] ‘any person  or 
persons,’ are broad enough to comprehend every human being,” such “general words must . . . be 
limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state.”). 
52. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97. 
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but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself 
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if 
committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents.  Some such 
offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the government because of the local acts required to constitute them.  
Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial 
jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the 
statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed 
by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home.  In 
such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific 
provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and 
foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the 
offense.53 
The Court did not make clear whether it intended to create a broad 
exception to the ordinary presumption for certain types of statutes or, 
alternatively, indicate a narrow set of circumstances under which the 
presumption could be overcome.  That oversight, unfortunately, has 
caused great confusion for lower courts trying to interpret the decision’s 
meaning. 
By its terms, Bowman appears to cover only a narrow subset of cases, 
namely those where the “nature of the offense” implicates the 
government’s right “to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud 
wherever perpetrated.”54  In fact, the Bowman Court was quite specific 
about the kinds of statutes that would permit a court to infer 
extraterritorial intent.  Among those it listed as examples were laws that 
punished “knowingly certify[ing] a false invoice [while acting as a U.S. 
consul],” “forging or altering a ship’s papers,” “enticing desertions from 
the naval service,” “bribing a United States officer of the civil, military 
or naval service,” and “steal[ing] . . . property of the United States . . . to 
be used for military or naval service.”55 
All of the aforementioned crimes share two common features.  First, 
they are all directed at the federal government itself.  Second, each is 
likely to occur outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.56  
Accordingly, Bowman is properly read as fashioning a statutory 
interpretation test consisting of two operative conditions, both of which 
must be satisfied before a court can infer extraterritoriality from “the 
 
53. Id. at 98 (emphasis added). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 99. 
56. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 
Support of Defendants-Appellants at 11, United States v. Mandell, No. 12-cr-1967 (2d Cir. 2012), 
2012 WL 4336737 (“Consuls, ships, naval service, prizes—all clearly connote the high seas or 
foreign lands.”). 
TAKING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY SERIOUSLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/13/2014  1:16 PM 
2013]    Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Seriously 83 
nature of the offense.”57 
This is precisely how the Supreme Court characterized Bowman in a 
subsequent decision, Skiriotes v. Florida, where it cited the case for the 
proposition that “a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly 
injurious to the government, and are capable of perpetration without 
regard to particular locality is to be construed as applicable to citizens 
of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though 
there be no express declaration to that effect.”58  Otherwise, as the 
Court recognized in another case postdating Bowman, “criminal statutes 
of the United States are not by implication given an extraterritorial 
effect.”59  What is more, as the Second Circuit has recognized, the 
Court’s frequent pronouncements on the presumption in recent years, 
“none of which mention[] Bowman, seem to require that all statutes, 
without exception, be construed to apply within the United States only, 
unless a contrary intent appears.”60 
Notwithstanding these precedents, the government has put forward an 
alternative reading of Bowman in several post-Morrison criminal cases.  
It has argued that Bowman exempts all statutes from the ordinary 
presumption against extraterritoriality when they are applied to a 
criminal defendant.61  Hence, the government would give section 10(b) 
two distinct meanings—one for civil cases and another for criminal 
prosecutions.  In making a similar argument regarding RICO, 
government attorneys went so far as to suggest that, under Bowman, 
statutes actually enjoy a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality in 
criminal cases.62 
The government’s argument would be remarkable for its audacity 
were it not for the fact that lower courts routinely misinterpret Bowman 
in a similar fashion.63  In their zeal to affirm the extraterritorial reach of 
 
57. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. 
58. 313 U.S. 69, 73–74 (1941) (emphasis added). 
59. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933) (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98). 
60. Kollias v. D & G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that “Bowman 
should be read narrowly” and that “[r]eading Bowman as limited to its facts, only criminal 
statutes, and perhaps only those relating to the government’s power to prosecute wrongs 
committed against it, are exempt from the presumption”). 
61. Sur-Reply Brief for the United States at 8, United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-
580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL 4608948 (2d Cir. 2012), 2012 WL 1799150. 
62. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Limited Rehearing En Banc at 
3, Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 07-4553-cv) 
[hereinafter United States as Amicus Norex Brief]. 
63. See Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law 
After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 165 (2011) 
(“[C]ourts [of appeals] have repeatedly stretched the substantive reasoning of Bowman to apply 
more and more criminal statutes extraterritorially.”). 
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criminal prosecutions, lower courts have occasionally cited Bowman as 
reason to exempt criminal statutes from the presumption altogether.64  
More commonly, courts have invoked Bowman to support the 
extraterritorial application of any law whose “nature” suggests 
transborder conduct or whose effectiveness could be hindered if 
confined to the territorial United States.65  Thus, even crimes that do not 
directly victimize U.S. interests or persons have been given 
extraterritorial effect.  Instances where courts have declined to apply a 
criminal statute extraterritorially, by comparison, have become the 
exception rather than the rule.66  Among the disparate statutes courts 
have exempted from the territorial presumption are those directed at 
price-fixing by foreign corporations,67 the dissemination of child 
pornography,68 drug trafficking,69 firearms possession,70 and murder or 
 
64. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Kassar, 
660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011). 
65. Zachary Clopton argues that Morrison’s emphasis on congressional “focus” might actually 
enable courts to affirm this prior case law expansively interpreting Bowman.  See Clopton, supra 
note 63, at 139 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, which seemingly narrowed 
the situations to which U.S. law applies, actually permits a new approach that the Supreme Court 
could follow in affirming much of the criminal law trend.”). 
66. We have only been able to locate five cases where the presumption served to defeat the 
government’s attempted extraterritorial application of a federal criminal statute.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Lopez-Vanegas, 493 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1) and 846, which make it unlawful for any person to conspire to possess a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute, do not apply extraterritorially); United States v. Gatlin, 216 
F.3d 207, 210–11 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining defendant could not be prosecuted for sexual 
assault on a German military base because courts must presume jurisdictional statutes have no 
extraterritorial effect); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding 
against the extraterritorial application of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972); United 
States v. Reeves, 62 M.J. 88, 92 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (concluding that the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 does not apply extraterritorially); United States v. Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52, 
59 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (same). 
67. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
criminal provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, like their civil counterparts, apply to wholly 
extraterritorial conduct). 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1231 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[E]xtraterritorial 
application is supported by the nature of § 2251A and Congress’s other efforts to combat child 
pornography.”); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993) (“‘[T]o deny 
[extraterritorial application of the Act] would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the 
statute[s].’  We can think of few more important efforts than eradicating sexual exploitation of 
children.” (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922))); United States v. Thomas, 
893 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Congress has created a comprehensive statutory 
scheme to eradicate sexual exploitation of children. . . . Punishing the creation of child 
pornography outside the United States that is actually, is intended to be, or may reasonably be 
expected to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce is an important enforcement tool.”). 
69. For instance, every circuit agrees that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it a crime to 
“manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance,” reaches at least some extraterritorial conduct.  Interestingly, 
courts have offered different justifications for why § 841(a)(1) applies extraterritoriality.  See, 
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other violent acts committed to further a racketeering enterprise.71  The 
Eleventh Circuit has aptly summarized the prevailing attitude of most 
courts: “On authority of Bowman, courts in this Circuit and elsewhere 
have routinely inferred congressional intent to provide for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign offenses that cause domestic 
harm.”72  Thus, in the criminal context, the presumption against 
extraterritorially has been flipped on its head. 
 
e.g., United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding extraterritorial 
application appropriate because the statute “comports with the reasoning behind the Supreme 
Court’s Bowman decision . . . [and] ‘[i]t would be going too far to say that because Congress does 
not fix any locus it intended to exclude the high seas in respect of this crime’” (second alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 
167 (3d Cir. 1986) (reasoning that “Congress undoubtedly intended to prohibit conspiracies to 
import controlled substances . . . as part of its continuing effort to contain the evils caused on 
American soil by foreign as well as domestic suppliers of illegal narcotics” and concluding that 
“[t]o deny such use of the criminal provisions ‘would be greatly to curtail the scope and 
usefulness of the statute[s]’” (quoting Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98)); United States v. Orozco-Prada, 
732 F.2d 1076, 1088 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The intent to cause effects within the United States also 
makes it reasonable to apply to persons outside United States territory a statute which is not 
expressly extraterritorial in scope.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 137 
(5th Cir. 1980) (upholding the extraterritorial application of the statute to defendants accused of 
possessing marijuana bound for the United States because “[t]he power to control efforts to 
introduce illicit drugs into the United States from the high seas and foreign nations is a necessary 
incident to Congress’ efforts to eradicate all illegal drug trafficking”); United States v. Arra, 630 
F.2d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 1980) (omitting mention of the presumption but affirming the conviction 
because “[a] sovereign may exercise jurisdiction over acts done outside its geographical 
jurisdiction which are intended to produce detrimental effects within it”).  But see United States v. 
Lopez-Vanegas, 493 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]here, as here, the object of the 
conspiracy was to possess controlled substances outside the United States with the intent to 
distribute outside the United States, there is no violation of § 841(a)(1) . . . .”); accord United 
States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Gould, 13 M.J. 734, 738 
(A.C.M.R. 1982). 
70. See, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 814–15 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying 
Bowman to illegal firearm possession); United States v. Ahmed, 10-Cr-131 (PKC), 2012 WL 
983545, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (allowing § 924(c), which prohibits illegal firearm 
possession, to have extraterritorial application); United States v. Mardirossian, 818 F. Supp. 2d 
775, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same). 
71. United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994). 
72. United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).  
Plummer reversed a district court’s holding that 18 U.S.C. § 545, which makes smuggling a crime 
punishable by up to twenty years in prison, did not apply to a defendant captured with thousands 
of Cuban cigars outside the territorial waters of the United States.  Id. at 1305 (“Although the 
completed crime of smuggling does require some conduct within U.S. territory, smuggling is 
quintessentially an international crime, and the acts constituting an attempt to smuggle are not 
‘logically dependent on their locality.’” (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98)); see also Brulay v. 
United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967) (“Since smuggling by its very nature involves 
foreign countries, and since the accomplishment of the crime always requires some action in a 
foreign country, we have no difficulty inferring that Congress did intend that the provisions of 18 
U.S.C. § 545 should extend to foreign countries at least as to citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
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The tendency of courts to discern the extraterritorial reach of criminal 
statutes by asking whether the underlying conduct they seek to prohibit 
causes domestic harm is remarkably similar to the “conduct-and-effects 
test” that the Supreme Court recently repudiated in Morrison.  In 
Morrison, foreign plaintiffs attempted to sue predominantly foreign 
defendants under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act for 
making false and misleading statements in connection with foreign 
securities transactions involving an Australian bank.73  Applying long-
settled precedent, the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
the case because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either that the wrongful 
conduct had occurred in the United States or that it had substantial 
effects on the United States or its citizens.74 
While reaching the same outcome, the Supreme Court faulted the 
Second Circuit’s reasoning on two grounds.  First, the question of 
extraterritoriality should be properly conceived of as a merits question 
rather than a jurisdictional one.  In other words, “to ask what conduct § 
10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits,”75 not whether 
Congress has empowered U.S. courts to hear the underlying claim.  
Second, the Court chided the Second Circuit for having “excised the 
presumption against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of § 
10(b)” by replacing it with a test that asked “whether it would be 
reasonable . . . to apply the statute to a given situation.”76  Such a test, 
the Court commented, was a judicial invention that lacked a “textual or 
even extratextual basis.”77  Instead, courts should “apply the 
presumption in all cases” in order to “preserv[e] a stable background 
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”78 
To be sure, Morrison involved the interpretation of a civil statute.  
But there is little reason to think its logic does not apply with equal 
force to criminal ones.  Indeed, as this Article shows, there is no 
compelling reason for applying the presumption against 
extraterritorially differently based on whether a statute (or its 
application) is criminal or civil in nature.  Whatever one thinks of its 
validity, the presumption represents a general impression of how 
Congress ordinarily enacts laws as well as a prudential preference that it 
make its intentions explicit when it wishes to apply those laws abroad.  
 
73. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010). 
74. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
75. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
76. Id. at 2878–79. 
77. Id. at 2879. 
78. Id. at 2881. 
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In both the criminal and civil contexts, Congress is well aware of how 
to give extraterritorial effect to its statutes.  When it fails to do so, 
courts ought to assume that the law applies to domestic conduct only.79  
The question then becomes one of degree, namely whether a 
defendant’s domestic conduct, if any, rises to a level sufficient to trigger 
liability under the charged offense. 
B. Understanding the Purposes of the Presumption in Civil and 
Criminal Cases 
This Section will demonstrate that the four values commonly cited in 
support of the presumption apply with equal force to criminal statutes.80  
The weight given to these values by the Court has varied over time, 
leading some commentators to question the presumption’s utility as a 
tool of statutory interpretation.  While we acknowledge the legitimacy 
of some of these criticisms, our primary concern is to show that, so long 
as the presumption exists, there can be no valid reason for restricting its 
application to civil statutes alone. 
For starters, the Morrison Court noted that the presumption rests on 
the general observation that “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect 
to domestic, not foreign matters.”81  Although one can question the 
accuracy of that observation given our increasingly globalized world,82 
there is little reason (empirical or otherwise) to think Congress is more 
likely to believe it is legislating globally when addressing criminal, as 
opposed to civil, concerns.  Moreover, as the U.S. Code amply 
demonstrates, Congress knows how to give extraterritorial effect to its 
statutes when it wants to.83 
 
79. Here, we take issue with an idea put forward by Clopton, supra note 63, at 187 (proposing 
that courts, in interpreting criminal statutes, could “apply[] Chevron-type deference to the 
executive branch in foreign affairs”). 
80. For a general discussion of the history behind this “long-standing” presumption, see 
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 85, 115–20 (1998). 
81. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)). 
82. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 660 (1990) (arguing the 
presumption “is no longer valid; Congress has expanded its regulatory interests to meet growing 
transnational markets and problems.  To enforce a strict territorial result in extraterritorial cases is 
to ignore the more likely contemporary intent of Congress”); James E. Ward, “Is That Your Final 
Answer?” The Patchwork Jurisprudence Surrounding the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 717 (2002) (arguing “that the premises supporting the 
existence of the presumption are no longer valid, and the doctrine should therefore be reversed to 
support a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality”). 
83. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of examples in the U.S. Code.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 
2339B(d) (2012) (material support for terrorism) (entitled “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction” and 
describing conditions where its exercise is authorized); id. § 3271(a) (sex trafficking) (“Whoever, 
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The Morrison Court’s second rationale for the presumption—
“preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate 
with predictable effects”—likewise draws no distinction between a 
law’s civil and criminal application.84  Professor William Eskridge has 
analogized this justification to “driving a car on the right-hand side of 
the road,” explaining that “[i]t is not so important to choose the best 
convention as it is to choose one convention and stick to it.”85  If the 
value of the presumption lies in ensuring predictability, surely courts 
ought to apply the rule uniformly to all statutes rather than “guess anew 
in each case” by engaging in what Morrison derisively termed “judicial-
speculation-made-law.”86 
A third consideration, largely dismissed as irrelevant by the Morrison 
majority87 but featured prominently in Justice Roberts’s Kiobel 
opinion,88 justifies the presumption as a prudential doctrine that helps 
prevent embarrassing or dangerous conflicts with foreign laws and 
foreign sovereigns.  In this vein, as Justice Rehnquist noted in EEOC v. 
 
while employed by or accompanying the Federal Government outside the United States, engages 
in conduct outside the United States that would constitute an offense under chapter 77 or 117 of 
this title if the conduct had been engaged in within the United States or within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for that 
offense.”); 21 U.S.C. § 960a(b)(5) (2012) (illicit drug import and export) (“There is jurisdiction 
over an offense under this section if . . . (5) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an 
offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense 
occurs outside the United States.”). 
84. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881. 
85. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 277 (1994).  
Eskridge is critical of the Court’s decision in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), 
which applied the presumption to invalidate an American-born plaintiff’s Title VII suit alleging 
discrimination by Aramco in Saudi Arabia.  For the presumption to be valid, Eskridge explains, 
the interpretive regime must remain both transparent and fixed.  But, he argues that a 
congressional observer at the time of Title VII’s passage would not have realized that the 
presumption was good law, much less that it required something close to a clear statement by 
Congress to overcome.  Id. at 281–85. 
86. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881. 
87. Id. at 2877–78 (“The canon or presumption [against extraterritoriality] applies regardless 
of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.”). 
88. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“The presumption 
against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an 
interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the 
political branches.”); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting 
that the presumption “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of 
other nations which could result in international discord”); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de 
Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) (refusing to construe the National Labor Relations 
Act as including foreign flagged vessels within its coverage because doing so “would inevitably 
lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs”); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 
138, 147 (1957) (“For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there 
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.”). 
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Arabian American Oil Co., the presumption serves to “protect against 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which 
could result in international discord.”89  Of course, few issues are more 
politically sensitive than a nation’s claimed authority to criminally 
punish the citizens of a foreign sovereign for acts committed abroad.  
The recent prosecution of Viktor Bout offers a colorful illustration.  
Bout, a Russian arms dealer nicknamed the “merchant of death,” was 
arrested in Thailand pursuant to an American sting operation in which 
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents portrayed 
themselves as members of the Colombian terrorist group Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucinares de Colombia (“FARC”).90  Bout’s contested 
extradition and subsequent conviction prompted a stern rebuke from the 
Russian foreign ministry, which accused the American justice system of 
fulfilling a “political order” and warned of possible harm to U.S.-
Russian relations.91  Russia’s reaction to Bout’s prosecution reveals the 
complexity of applying the presumption in a criminal context.  Matters 
of foreign policy and decisions concerning whom to prosecute are 
ordinarily entrusted to the Executive’s exclusive discretion.  Such 
deference, however, is constitutionally appropriate only where the 
Executive’s power is exclusive or its power to prosecute is clear.  
Courts, by invoking the presumption only where Congress has not 
spoken clearly concerning a statute’s geographic scope, can restrain 
executive action in a manner that is consistent with their limited role in 
our democratic system of government.   
Relatedly, the presumption is sometimes envisioned as serving 
broader structural concerns that affirm Congress’s role in the 
lawmaking process and limit activist judicial interpretations.  As 
Professor Curtis Bradley has explained in evaluating the basis for the 
presumption in patent cases, “[T]he determination of whether and how 
to apply federal legislation to conduct abroad raises difficult and 
sensitive policy questions that tend to fall outside both the institutional 
competence and constitutional prerogatives of the judiciary.”92  In 
 
89. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248. 
90. U.S. officials brought a tremendous degree of political pressure to bear on their Thai 
counterparts in order to secure Bout’s extradition.  Indeed, the battle over his extradition 
constituted a sort of proxy war between the United States and Russia.  See Johnny Dwyer, 
Wikileaks: How the U.S. Helped Bring in a ‘Merchant of Death,’ TIME, Dec. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2034760,00.html. 
91. Michael Schwirtz, Russia Denounces U.S. Sentencing of Arms Dealer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/07/world/europe/russia-denounces-us-sentencing-of-
arms-dealer.html?_r=0. 
92. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 505, 516 (1997). 
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addition, the executive branch may seek to apply certain statutes in a 
manner that Congress never intended to authorize.93  Such concerns are 
amplified in the criminal setting because prosecutors, as opposed to 
private litigants, purport to speak on behalf of the U.S. government. 
One significant counterargument for refraining from applying the 
presumption in criminal and/or regulatory matters merits 
consideration.94  That argument embodies a functionalist concern with 
the different incentives that motivate civil litigants and government 
officials.  In its most basic form, the argument would proceed as 
follows: absent Morrison’s and Kiobel’s holdings, U.S. courts would 
face an avalanche of nuisance suits directed at foreign corporations.95  
As a consequence, those corporations would spend substantial sums to 
settle or otherwise avoid liability by circumventing personal jurisdiction 
or conduct-and-effects hooks to the United States.96  Actions initiated 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or the Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) are inherently different, according to the argument’s 
logic.  Unlike civil plaintiffs, U.S. Attorneys and government regulators 
can be counted on to exercise discretion before initiating a 
prosecution.97  Moreover, courts may reasonably rely on the expectation 
 
93. One example, though perhaps an imperfect one, is the EEOC’s effort to apply the 
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act abroad.  In EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., the 
agency argued that Congress, in passing Title VII, intended for its provisions to cover Americans 
employed by American corporations outside the United States.  499 U.S. at 248.  But the Court 
was unable to find any “affirmative evidence” that Congress intended for the statute to apply in 
such a manner and further noted that “Congress’ awareness of the need to make [such a showing] 
is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the 
extraterritorial application of a statute.”  Id. at 258.  Some scholars have criticized the Court’s 
interpretation on the grounds that “there was ample legislative and implied textual evidence of 
congressional extraterritorial intent.”  Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of 
International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 221 (1993).  But even if such criticisms are 
true, the underlying rationale of the opinion survives.  In the face of perceived ambiguity, there is 
a salutary value to having Congress make its intentions explicit, as it did with respect to Title 
VII’s extraterritorial application the year after Arabian Am. Oil Co. was decided.  See Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a)–(b)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-1 (2012)). 
94. We are indebted to Daniel Hemel for alerting us to this counterargument. 
95. Kara Baquizal, The Extraterritorial Reach of Section 10(B): Revisiting Morrison in Light 
of Dodd-Frank, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1544, 1580 (“The United States should not open itself up 
to plaintiffs hoping to take advantage of the United States’ entrepreneurial legal system with the 
aid of attorneys willing to search every securities transaction with a fine-toothed comb to find 
some tenuous connection to the United States.”). 
96. Id. at 1555 (“Making the private right of action under §10(b) available to investors 
involved in predominantly international transactions, such as ‘f-cubed’ transactions, would be the 
type of legal cost that a non-US issuer might find too great, to the detriment of the US markets.”). 
97. The appellants in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum embraced an analogous argument 
regarding universal jurisdiction.  See Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 42, Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petrol., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2012) (No. 10-1491) (“The distinction between universal criminal 
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that there will be some coordination between executive agencies and the 
State Department over issues of international comity.98  Finally, 
resource constraints on prosecutors will serve to defeat any potential 
litigation flood.99 
Admittedly, these arguments may be persuasive from a policy 
standpoint.  At least in the securities law context Congress seems to 
have thought so, as evidenced by its insertion of a provision into the 
Dodd-Frank Act that purportedly permits extraterritorial actions by the 
SEC and DOJ, but not by civil litigants.100  And one can imagine other 
contexts where distinguishing between civil matters, on the one hand, 
and regulatory or criminal matters, on the other, would make sense.101 
But that is precisely the point of the presumption: it is the courts’ 
“function to give the statute the effect its language suggests, however 
modest that may be; not to extend it to admirable purposes it might be 
used to achieve.”102  That is because a statute’s potential extraterritorial 
application is the type of sensitive policy determination the Constitution 
has appropriately delegated to Congress.  If Congress, in turn, wishes to 
delegate that responsibility to executive agencies, that is fine.  But one 
should expect, at a minimum, for it to say so explicitly.103  Whether or 
 
and civil jurisdiction makes sense because a private civil cause of action lacks ‘the check imposed 
by prosecutorial discretion.’” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004))). 
98. Curtis Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 347 
(2001) (“Whereas the government is responsible in the criminal context for considering the 
foreign policy costs of exercising universal jurisdiction, private plaintiffs in civil cases have no 
such responsibility and, in any event, are unlikely to have the incentive or expertise to do so.”); 
see also United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The 
executive’s expert exercise of prosecutorial discretion and foreign diplomacy should be more than 
sufficient to avoid the conflicts the dissent thinks our holding risks creating.”); Clopton, supra 
note 63, at 187 (“Even if courts worry only about conflicts with foreign laws, the executive 
branch is likely to be more cognizant of these potential conflicts than the average civil plaintiff.”). 
99. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 519 (2003) 
(“Resource constraints, a potent brake on overprosecution in domestic systems, will limit the ICC 
Prosecutor’s ability to pursue all meritorious cases.”). 
100. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
101. Arguably, the Alien Tort Statute is one context where Congress might wish to distinguish 
between civil and regulatory enforcement based on the locus of the alleged acts.  As the Court 
explained in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), private causes of action like the ATS 
lack the “check imposed by prosecutorial discretion.”  Id. at 727.  Consequently, they arguably 
pose a greater threat to U.S. foreign relations than do the limited number of prosecutions for 
international human rights violations that Congress has seen fit to authorize.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1091, 2340A, 2441 (2012) (genocide, torture, and war crimes, respectively). 
102. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010). 
103. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 377–80 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Congress, which has the sole authority to determine the extraterritorial reach of domestic laws, 
is fully capable of conveying its policy choice to the Executive and the courts.  I would not 
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not it is wise policy for Congress or the Executive to apply a statute 
extraterritorially is, after all, a different question than whether courts 
should interpret that statute as encompassing extraterritorial acts.104  
Based on the principles guiding the presumption as outlined in 
Morrison and Kiobel, we think the answer to the latter question is 
clearly “no.” 
II. APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION AFTER MORRISON AND KIOBEL: SECTION 
10(B) AND BEYOND 
This Part offers a nuanced explanation of how various criminal 
statutes will fare after Morrison and Kiobel.  The question is more 
complex than it initially appears because determining whether a statute 
applies extraterritorially is not simply a matter of reading its text.  For 
one, Morrison and Kiobel did not endorse a clear statement rule and 
therefore, context still matters.  Does this mean courts can infer 
extraterritorial application from the “nature” of the offense à la 
Bowman?  Is it enough to characterize the offense in question as one 
that often occurs internationally, such as drug smuggling? 
Second, as the Morrison court explained, “it is a rare case of 
prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the 
territory of the United States.”105  Courts must therefore identify a 
statute’s “focus” before determining whether a defendant’s domestic 
conduct is sufficient for criminal liability to attach.  In Morrison, for 
instance, the Court determined that “the focus of the Exchange Act is 
not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases 
and sales of securities in the United States.”106  Consequently, the locus 
of the Morrison defendants’ alleged deception was irrelevant since the 
securities transactions at issue occurred in Australia.  According to 
Justice Stevens, this focus test, rather than the presumption, was the 
“real motor” of the Court’s decision.107  Sometimes determining a 
statute’s focus is straightforward, but in other cases Congress may have 
 
assume from legislative silence that Congress left the matter to executive discretion.”). 
104. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“[T]he danger of 
unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of 
the ATS, because the question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”); 
see also United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The point of 
the policy concerns ‘behind’ the presumption against applying statutes to have extraterritorial 
effect is that they mean that a court should ordinarily understand Congress’s commands to apply 
only within U.S. borders, not that a court should itself apply those policy concerns to the case at 
bar and read the statute based on the result of its own policy analysis.”). 
105. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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had many goals or its intent might not be otherwise apparent. 
What is more, determining a statute’s focus is only half the battle.  
Courts must also decide when a defendant’s domestic conduct is 
sufficient to bring it within a statute’s reach.  In Kiobel, for instance, the 
Court emphasized that “even where [ATS] claims touch and concern the 
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”108  But as 
Justice Alito noted in his concurrence, “[t]his formulation obviously 
leaves much unanswered.”109  The goal of this Part is to begin to fill in 
the blanks. 
In addition to analyzing section 10(b), this Part reviews two other 
statutes whose extraterritorial scope is similarly ambiguous: RICO and 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  While these are certainly not the only statutes 
whose interpretation Morrison is likely to affect, they are among the 
most important.  Both statutes impose lengthy mandatory minimum 
sentences on criminal defendants.  RICO, which criminalizes 
racketeering activity by criminal enterprises, appears to be Morrison’s 
next victim because, like section 10(b), it is silent regarding its 
extraterritoriality and subjects defendants to both civil and criminal 
penalties.110  Some courts, including the Second and Ninth circuits, 
have already relied on Morrison to bar RICO’s extraterritorial 
application.111  Because the same substantive statute governs civil and 
criminal RICO actions, the statutory construction issue is identical to 
that of section 10(b).  On the other hand, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which 
makes it a crime to possess a weapon in connection with certain 
enumerated felonies, has no civil component.  It is nevertheless a 
shining example of a statute whose reach should be restricted if the 
presumption is to be meaningfully applied in criminal cases going 
forward. 
A. Section 10(b) 
 Because Morrison involved a private civil lawsuit, the Supreme 
Court did not have occasion to consider whether or how the 
presumption would apply in criminal prosecutions.  Two Second Circuit 
cases, one recently decided and the other still pending, help illustrate 
how courts have begun to resolve these unanswered questions.112  Both 
 
108. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
109. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
110. For a detailed discussion of civil RICO in light of Morrison, see R. Davis Mello, Life 
After Morrison: Extraterritoriality and RICO, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1385 (2011). 
111. See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text. 
112. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL 
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Alberto Vilar and Ross Mandell, the primary defendants in the two 
cases, are larger-than-life figures convicted of violating section 10(b) by 
engineering Ponzi-like schemes that defrauded both foreign and 
American investors.  On appeal, they each argued that Morrison 
clarified the reach of section 10(b) in such a way that their securities 
fraud convictions ought to be reversed.113  In August, the panel hearing 
Vilar’s appeal rejected the government’s broad argument that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has no effect on criminal statutes.  
Instead, the court affirmed the presumption’s general applicability to all 
actions, while concluding Vilar and his co-defendant had nonetheless 
engaged in substantial domestic conduct to bring their criminal scheme 
within the statute’s ambit.  
 Prior to his conviction, Vilar, who at one point was among the top 
benefactors of New York’s Metropolitan Opera, had a long track record 
of successful investments in technology companies.114  But the crash of 
the Internet bubble, together with his penchant for underwriting 
expensive opera productions, proved to be his undoing.115  In 
November 2008, prior to the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision, a jury 
convicted Vilar and his business partner Gary Tanaka of using their 
SEC-registered advisory firm to entice American investors into 
purchasing fraudulent investment products.116  According to the 
evidence presented at trial, Vilar and Tanaka used the proceeds of those 
investments for their own personal use, principally to cover Vilar’s 
spiraling debts.117  Of central importance to their appeal was that the 
primary investment vehicle underlying the section 10(b) charge was 
registered under foreign, rather than domestic, law.118  Moreover, nearly 
all of the purchases and sales occurred outside the United States so 
investors could avoid paying federal taxes.119 
 
4608948 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013); United States v. Mandell, No. 12-cr-1967 (2d Cir. 2012). 
113. Brief for Appellant Alberto Vilar at 63, Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948 (Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-
580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON)), 2011 WL 4735336; Brief for Appellant Ross H. Mandell at 19, 
Mandell, No. 12-cr-1967, 2012 WL 4336737. 
114. James B. Stewart, Onward and Upward with the Arts: The Opera Lover, THE NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/13/060213 
fa_fact_stewart. 
115. Id. 
116. Daniel J. Wakin, Music Patron is Convicted of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/arts/music/20vila.html?_r=0ats/music/20vila.html. 
117. Trial Transcript at 4609, United States v. Vilar, No. 05-cr-621 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
[hereinafter Vilar Trial Transcript]. 
118. Brief for Appellant Alberto Vilar, supra note 113, at 65. 
119. Id. (“The lion’s share of investors about whom proof was offered at trial did their 
purchasing through entities that were specifically designed and organized offshore as part of a 
deliberate tax management strategy by the investors.” (citing Vilar Trial Transcript, supra note 
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 Ross Mandell led a similarly adventurous, albeit less financially 
remunerative, existence.  In the 1990s, Mandell was the subject of a 
front page Wall Street Journal article that noted numerous SEC 
complaints against him as well as a six-week suspension by the New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).120  While Mandell “seem[ed] to be 
thriving” less than a decade later while running a brokerage firm in the 
United Kingdom called Sky Capital Holdings,121 his supposed success 
turned out to be illusory.  In 2009, Mandell was arrested by FBI agents 
and charged with several counts of securities fraud related to activities 
that occurred between 1998 and 2006.122  The indictment accused him 
of engineering a $140 million fraud whose object was the inflation of 
Sky Capital Holdings’ stock price.123  Significantly, Sky Capital 
Holdings was registered on the London Alternative Investment Index 
rather than the NYSE and the majority of Mandell’s victims were 
British.124  While charges against Mandell were pending, the Supreme 
Court decided Morrison.  The government, perhaps fearing a potential 
dismissal, amended its indictment to include mail and wire fraud 
charges.125  In turn, Mandell made a motion requesting that all of the 
charges be dismissed.  The lower court rejected that motion, in part 
relying on Bowman for the proposition that “the United States is free to 
protect its citizens from fraud.”126 
 The government has gone one step further in both the Vilar and 
Mandell appeals by arguing that Morrison ought not apply at all in 
criminal prosecutions.127  The Second Circuit unequivocally rejected 
 
117)). 
120. Jeffrey Taylor, Art of Survival: How One Stockbroker Keeps on Selling, Despite 
Complaints, WALL ST. J., March 14, 1996, at A1. 
121. David Serchuk, Wall Street’s “Bad-boy” Broker Ross Mandell is Back with a Flair—
Pushing Stock and Courting Politicians, FORBES, Oct. 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/1003/062.html. 
122. Six Employees of Sky Capital Are Accused in a $140 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/business/09fraud.html. 
123. Indictment, United States v. Mandell, No. 09-cr-662 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009). 
124. United States v. Mandell, No. 09-cr-0662, 2011 WL 924891, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 
2011); Brief for Appellant Ross H. Mandell, supra note 113, at *2. 
125. Mandell, 2011 WL 924891, at *3.  In adding the mail and wire fraud counts, it appears 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office took a hint from Justice Breyer’s Morrison concurrence.  Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[W]hile state law or other federal fraud statutes, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud), § 1343 
(wire fraud), may apply to the fraudulent activity alleged here to have occurred in the United 
States, I believe that § 10(b) does not.”). 
126. Mandell, 2011 WL 924891, at *5 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922)). 
127. A primary point of contention in Vilar and Mandell’s appeals is whether the transactions 
at issue were foreign or domestic.  Compare Brief for Appellant Ross H. Mandell, supra note 
113, at *2, with Brief for the United States of America at 31, United States v. Mandell, No. 09-cr-
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that position in its recently issued opinion in United States v. Vilar, 
noting that to do otherwise “would establish the dangerous principle 
that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in 
different cases.”128  The court particularly faulted the government’s 
reliance on Bowman for the proposition that criminal statutes as a class 
ought to be exempted from the presumption.  “To the contrary,” the 
court explained, “no plausible interpretation of Bowman supports this 
broad proposition; fairly read, Bowman stands for quite the 
opposite.”129 
 Vilar’s impact on future securities fraud litigation is uncertain 
because shortly after Morrison was decided Congress amended section 
10(b), ostensibly to permit extraterritorial civil enforcement actions and 
criminal prosecutions.130  Yet section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act 
speaks in terms of providing federal courts with “extraterritorial 
jurisdiction” over such matters,131 whereas Morrison made clear that 
the issue was not one of jurisdiction, but instead concerned the statute’s 
substantive scope.132  Since the provision was enacted after Vilar and 
Tanaka’s convictions, and thus not implicated in their ensuing appeals, 
it remains to be seen whether the Second Circuit’s holding in Vilar will 
have continued resonance in the securities fraud context. 
 Where Vilar’s greater significance lies is in its potential to 
profoundly alter how courts interpret the extraterritorial reach of 
criminal statutes generally, much as Morrison transformed how lower 
courts analyze civil statutes.  That is because in rejecting the 
government’s expansive argument regarding Bowman, the Vilar court 
articulated a general rule that encompasses both civil and criminal 
statues alike.  As such, the decision offers substantial support to 
criminal defendants seeking to challenge their indictments or 
convictions. 
 To grasp Vilar’s significance, it is necessary to review the 
government’s three principle arguments in support of its position that 
 
0662 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2010), 2012 WL 6811426 [hereinafter United States of America Mandell 
Brief].  If the latter, each case would be treated as a traditional securities fraud prosecution and 
Morrison would not apply.  The resolution of this question, which depends to great extent on the 
factual subtleties of each case and the legal definition of a “domestic transaction,” is not our 
primary concern here. 
128. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL 
4608948, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005)). 
129. Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948, at *5. 
130. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
131. Id. 
132. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
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section 10(b) authorizes extraterritorial prosecutions.  First, it cites the 
mistaken, but oft-repeated, notion that “[t]he presumption that ordinary 
acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially does not apply to 
criminal statutes.”133  In fairness to the government, in two decisions 
postdating Morrison, the Second Circuit had itself cited Bowman as 
reason to ignore the presumption altogether in criminal cases.134  As 
demonstrated elsewhere, such an interpretation represents a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the presumption’s function.135  For its 
part, the Vilar court tempered the “broadly worded” language of prior 
Second Circuit opinions by recognizing that Bowman must be 
understood in context as creating only a narrow exception in instances 
where “the right of the government to defend itself” is directly 
implicated.136  
 The government further argues that applying the presumption in 
criminal cases would necessitate a finding that Morrison implicitly 
overruled Bowman.137  Since repeals by implication are frowned upon, 
the government reasons the presumption should carry no weight in 
criminal cases.138  The problem with this analysis is that it creates a 
false conflict between the two precedents.  Bowman itself explicitly 
recognized the presumption’s continuing validity in ordinary criminal 
cases.139  As Vilar underscores, Bowman is most faithfully read as 
embodying a narrow carve out for instances where the object of a 
statute’s text is the protection of U.S. sovereign interests.140 
 
133. United States of America Mandell Brief, supra note 127, at 34 (quoting United States v. 
Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
134. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The ordinary presumption 
that laws do not apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes.”); Al Kassar, 660 
F.3d at 118 (“The presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially does 
not apply to criminal statutes.”). 
135. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
136. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL 
4608948, at *6 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) (explaining that Siddiqui and Al Kassar are best 
understood “in context” as “simply applications of Bowman’s holding”). 
137. Brief for the United States of America, Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948 (Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-
580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON)) (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 2012), 2012 WL 1076169, at *97–98 
[hereinafter United States of America Vilar Brief]; United States of America Mandell Brief, 
supra note 127, at 35–36. 
138. United States of America Vilar Brief, supra note 137, at *98 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shaearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 
U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to 
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the 
case that directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). 
139. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1114 provides such an example.  The statute makes it a crime to kill or 
attempt to kill “any officer or employee of the United States . . . while such officer or employee is 
engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.”  One could argue that Bowman 
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 The government’s final argument is a familiarly functionalist one.  
Limiting section 10(b)’s scope, it argues, “would create a broad 
immunity for criminal conduct simply because the fraudulent scheme 
culminates in a purchase or sale abroad.”141  Such a concern echoes that 
raised by Justice Stevens in his Morrison concurrence.142  While the 
Morrison majority brushed off the idea that the United States might 
become a “Barbary coast” for fraud,143 Justice Stevens identified certain 
harms that could accrue to U.S. citizens as a consequence of the 
majority’s holding.  His critique seems prescient in light of the pending 
litigation: 
Imagine . . . an American investor who buys shares in a company listed 
only on an overseas exchange.  That company has a major American 
subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it was in New 
York City that the executives masterminded and implemented a 
massive deception which artificially inflated the stock price—and 
which will, upon its disclosure, cause the price to plummet.  Or, 
imagine that those same executives go knocking on doors in Manhattan 
and convince an unsophisticated retiree, on the basis of material 
misrepresentations, to invest her life savings in the company’s doomed 
securities.  Both of these investors would, under the Court’s new test, 
be barred from seeking relief under § 10(b).144 
Admittedly, Justice Stevens’s concerns are troubling, particularly in 
light of the fact that Morrison’s reliance on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality does not end the inquiry into a statute’s “focus.”  
Because statutes like RICO and section 10(b) “do[] not speak with 
geographic precision,”145 courts cannot avoid making difficult line-
 
applies only to statutes whose “focus” is U.S. personnel or interests and whose commission is 
likely to occur overseas, in which case 18 U.S.C. § 1114 probably would not overcome the 
presumption.  Zachary Clopton suggests courts could adopt an even narrower reading of the case, 
one limited to “statutes that protect government contracts from fraud and obstruction.”  Clopton, 
supra note 63, at 167.  This argument, however, may be foreclosed by Bowman itself, specifically 
the Court’s reference to other statutes that should similarly be read as having extraterritorial 
effect.  For instance, the Court cited 4 U.S.C. § 39, which penalized “bribing a United States 
officer of the civil, military, or naval service to violate his duty or to aid in committing a fraud on 
the United States.”  Bowman, 260 U.S. at 99. 
141. United States of America Vilar Brief, supra note 137, at *98-99; see also United States 
of America Mandell Brief, supra note 127, at 40 (“[A]ccepting the defendants’ argument would 
render the criminal securities fraud laws ineffectual against U.S. citizens who commit certain 
securities fraud crimes from entirely within this country, creating a veritable safe harbor for 
fraudsters who are clever enough to draft securities offerings that would make transactions in the 
securities ‘foreign’ under Morrison.”). 
142. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring.) 
143. Id. at 2886 (majority opinion). 
144. Id. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
145. Id. at 2894. 
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drawing determinations, like whether a securities transaction or criminal 
enterprise is domestic or foreign in nature. 
 Where this Article parts company with Justice Stevens, however, is 
his assessment that courts are properly empowered to determine the 
substantive scope of federal criminal law.  The fact that Morrison’s 
interpretive inquiry may result in outcomes that courts find odious is not 
a valid justification for fashioning congressional intent where none 
exists.  And courts are not powerless to alert Congress to errors in 
legislative draftsmanship.  That is exactly what Judge Jose Cabranes, 
the author of the Vilar decision, did in United States v. Gatlin.146  After 
deciding that a jurisdictional statute, when read against the presumption, 
did not permit the U.S. government to prosecute a defendant accused of 
raping a minor on a U.S. military installation overseas, Cabranes 
directed his clerk to forward a copy of the opinion to the chairmen of 
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.147  Congress, in 
turn, responded by quickly closing the loophole.148  The proper question 
for a court to ask, therefore, is one of institutional competency, not what 
Congress might have wished had it thought of a particular problem 
beforehand. 
 In any event, there is a vast literature detailing many persuasive 
reasons to resist the expansion of federal criminal law.149  The point is 
simply that Congress is the proper body to decide the issue.  For even if 
a court could accurately predict what Congress would want, there are 
still good reasons to apply the presumption; forcing Congress to 
 
146. 216 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2000). 
147. Id. at 209. 
148. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 
(2012). 
149. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit 
the Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545, 552–53 (2004) (“No matter how many 
crimes Congress enacts, it remains for federal prosecutors to decide which statutes to invoke 
when proceeding to an indictment.  Many of the new crimes serve no other purpose than to make 
Congress look good with particular groups and/or on popular issues. . . . The availability of more 
crimes also affords the prosecutor more discretion, and, therefore, greater leverage against 
defendants.”); Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: 
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 
1642 (2001) (arguing that the pressure to enhance gun penalties has raised constitutional and 
prudential concerns, and that “enhancing the penalties under federal law and expanding the range 
of cases to which those penalties apply . . . has enhanced the prosecution’s bargaining power and 
its unchecked discretion in a wide range of cases”); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The 
Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 645 (1997) (arguing that the 
federalization of criminal law has led to the “dramatically disparate treatment of similarly situated 
offenders”); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited—the Federalization of Intrastate 
Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 274 (1973) (arguing that the federalization of intrastate crime 
“extend[s] the commerce power beyond previous limits”). 
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verbalize its intentions both familiarizes congressional representatives 
with the consequences of their votes and increases the legitimacy of 
enacted legislation. 
 The outcome of the Vilar litigation should further temper fears 
concerning the likelihood of a parade of horribles.  While the 
defendants achieved victory on the threshold issue of Morrison’s 
applicability to section 10(b) criminal prosecutions, the court 
nonetheless upheld their convictions after finding that they had engaged 
in sufficient domestic conduct to bring their actions within the statute’s 
prohibitions.150  Specifically, the court invoked a test it had previously 
articulated for determining whether a securities transaction was 
domestic or extraterritorial in nature.  According to that test, a 
transaction is domestic if title passes or a purchaser or seller incurs 
“irrevocable liability” to transfer title to a security within the territorial 
United States.151  Because some of the transactions at issue in Vilar and 
Tanaka’s alleged scheme satisfied this test,152 the court elected to 
uphold their convictions.  It did so notwithstanding the possibility that 
“in responding to a carefully drawn special verdict form, the jury would 
have found Vilar and Tanaka guilty only of defrauding victims outside 
of the United States.”153  The court also indicated, however, that the 
scheme’s collateral connections to the United States, including the 
mailing of marketing materials to U.S. customers, domestic wire 
transactions, and the use of a U.S. firm as the firm’s custodian, would 
not have sufficed to bring it within section 10(b)’s reach.154 
Vilar represents an important affirmation of the presumption’s 
applicability to criminal statutes. Yet it leaves many questions 
unanswered.  While the decision establishes the burden the government 
must overcome to establish a domestic securities transaction for the 
purpose of securing a criminal conviction, it offers no general method 
of determining the predominant locus of criminal conduct outside the 
section 10(b) context.  Nor does it offer any indication as to the kinds of 
contextual evidence that may be sufficient to overcome the presumption 
when applied to other criminal statutes.  Instead, in a fashion consistent 
with Morrison and Kiobel’s teachings, Vilar suggests lower courts must 
analyze statutes on a case-by-case basis to determine whether particular 
 
150. United States v. Vilar, Nos. 10-521-cr(L), 10-580-cr(CON), 10-4639-cr(CON), 2013 WL 
4608948, at *10–*11 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013). 
151. Id. at *9 (citing Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d 
Cir. 2012)). 
152. Id. at *10–*11. 
153. Id. at *10. 
154. Id. at * 9 n.10. 
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extraterritorial applications “are the objects of [a] statute’s 
solicitude.”155  To that end, in the following Sections we examine two 
areas of law—criminal RICO and 18 U.S.C. §924(c)—where courts 
have already begun to engage in that process.   
B. RICO 
This Section confronts the difficulties that lower courts have 
encountered when asked to apply RICO in a post-Morrison world.  
Congress passed RICO in 1970 after lengthy public hearings.156  The 
statute’s purpose was to eradicate “organized crime,” the activities of 
which Congress found to “weaken the stability of the Nation’s 
economic system, harm innocent investors and competing 
organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden 
interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and 
undermine the general welfare.”157  Although originally directed at the 
mafia’s infiltration of legitimate businesses, RICO has since been 
applied to a variety of organizations and activities, both foreign and 
domestic.158 
Prior to Morrison, courts routinely upheld extraterritorial 
“jurisdiction” over RICO offenses using the same conducts-and-effects 
test employed in section 10(b) cases.159  That is, courts asked whether 
the alleged racketeering activity occurred in, or had substantial effects 
upon, the United States sufficient to warrant a court’s exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Under this framework, courts had no 
occasion to ask whether the alleged criminal enterprise was domestic or 
foreign.  So long as the activities complained of occurred in or had 
effects on the United States, extraterritorial application of RICO seemed 
consistent with both Due Process and legislative intent.160 
 
155. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010). 
156. 18 U.S.C. §§1961–1964 (2012). 
157. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 
91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922–23 (1970). 
158. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 661, 661 (1987) (noting RICO’s “broad draftsmanship, which has left it open to a wide 
range of applications, not all of which were foreseen or intended by the Congress that enacted 
it”); id. at 662 (“Congress viewed RICO principally as a tool for attacking the specific problem of 
infiltration of legitimate business by organized criminal syndicates.  As such, RICO has hardly 
been a dramatic success.”). 
159. R. Davis Mello, Note, Life After Morrison: Extraterritoriality and RICO, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1385, 1387 n.12 (2011) (adopting the “widely accepted view . . . that RICO may 
apply extraterritorially if conduct material to the completion of the racketeering occurs in the 
United States, or if significant effects of the racketeering are felt here” (quoting Liquidation 
Comm’n of Banco Intercont’l, S.A. v. Alvarez Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2008))). 
160. Some courts reached this decision almost reflexively, whereas other courts engaged in a 
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Morrison upended this analysis.  Although Justice Scalia’s opinion 
did not mention RICO by name, every court that has considered the 
statute’s application since Morrison has found that it lacks 
extraterritorial effect.161  Indeed, these decisions follow logically from 
pre-Morrison holdings that RICO’s text is silent as to its extraterritorial 
reach.162  Constrained by these prior holdings and Morrison’s logic, 
both the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that RICO does not apply 
extraterritorially, though they have differed on precisely what this 
means in practice.163 
Two interpretive questions guide the analysis that follows.  First, 
recognizing that the majority of post-Morrison RICO decisions involve 
civil claims, this Article asks whether courts should interpret RICO’s 
scope congruently when applied in a criminal prosecution.  Second, it 
asks what Congress’s “focus” was in enacting RICO—the criminal 
enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity. 
The first question ought to be easily resolved.  Since RICO’s criminal 
and civil penalty provisions are premised on the same substantive 
conduct, they ought to be interpreted consistently.164  Put slightly 
differently, to ask what conduct RICO reaches is to ask what conduct it 
prohibits, not what penalties may be imposed in a civil or criminal 
action.  In this sense, the analysis is no different than that which applies 
in the section 10(b) context.  Nor is a Bowman argument more 
persuasive here—both section 10(b) and RICO are concerned with 
conduct that harms private actors or society generally rather than U.S. 
 
searching discussion of what Congress intended.  Compare Renta, 530 F.3d at 1351–52 (quoted 
above), with Butte Min. PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We do not suppose that 
Congress in enacting RICO had the purpose of punishing frauds by aliens abroad even if 
peripheral preparations were undertaken by them here.”), and N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 
F.3d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting same). 
161. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster 
Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 938–40 (N.D. Cal. 2012); CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 
824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1209–10 (D. Colo. 2011); Farm Credit Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Krones, 
Inc. (In re Le–Nature’s, Inc.), No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 n.7 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 
2011); In re Toyota, 785 F. Supp. 2d, 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011); United States v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2011); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-
CV-5771, 2011 WL 84395, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); Cedeno v. Intech Group, Inc., 733 F. 
Supp. 2d 471, 472–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
162. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004) (“RICO itself is silent 
as to its extraterritorial application.”); Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1051 (“The RICO statute is silent as 
to any extraterritorial application.”). 
163. Compare Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 976 (finding the pattern of racketeering activity to be 
RICO’s focus), with Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(limiting Morrison to domestic conduct but declining to specify RICO’s focus). 
164. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2012) (criminal penalties), with id. § 1964 (civil remedies). 
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sovereign interests. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. government has taken a contrary position.  In 
Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., a civil RICO case, a 
Second Circuit panel held that RICO has no extraterritorial 
application.165  The U.S. Attorney’s Office, concerned by the effect this 
decision would have on criminal prosecutions, took the somewhat 
unusual step of requesting a limited rehearing en banc so the panel 
could clarify that its decision did not apply to criminal RICO 
prosecutions.166  Specifically, it argued for an expansive reading of the 
Bowman exception and warned that: 
An overbroad reading of Morrison would potentially undercut 
government enforcement not only of RICO, but also of other 
provisions.  For example, applying a rigid “presumption against 
extraterritoriality,” without consideration of the specific statute and 
context at issue, could impair non-RICO criminal conspiracy 
prosecutions in cases related to international terrorism, narco-
trafficking, arms-trafficking, and organized crime, where much of the 
underlying conduct may have occurred abroad.  It could also impair 
government enforcement under statutes arising in other areas, 
including taxation and protection of the environment.167 
The Norex plaintiffs themselves never requested a rehearing en banc.  
Moreover, because the case involved a civil matter, neither the plaintiffs 
nor the defendants had reason to oppose the government’s request.168 
The Second Circuit panel obliged the government by amending its 
opinion without even scheduling a hearing.  The revised opinion 
included the following disclaimer: “Because Norex brought a private 
lawsuit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), we have no occasion to 
address—and express no opinion on—the extraterritorial application of 
RICO when enforced by the government pursuant to §§ 1962, 1963, 
1964(a) and (b).”169  Hence, by modifying its decision in this way, the 
Second Circuit panel implicitly deferred to the government’s continued 
reliance on RICO in extraterritorial prosecutions. 
The only court since Morrison to squarely address whether criminal 
RICO applies extraterritorially found that it did not, consistent with the 
 
165. Norex, 631 F.3d at 33. 
166. United States as Amicus Norex Brief, supra note 62. 
167. Id. at 7 n.8. 
168. Even the government’s motion for rehearing acknowledged as much, though the panel 
opinion strikingly did not.  See id. at 2 (“[A]lthough Norex has not sought panel rehearing, that 
would not preclude the panel from simply amending its opinion sua sponte to account for these 
concerns set forth in this brief.”). 
169. Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2010), amended and 
superseded, 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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foregoing analysis.  In that case, United States v. Chao Fan Xu, the 
Ninth Circuit did not even go to the trouble of addressing the 
government’s Bowman argument.170  Instead, it simply began “with a 
presumption that RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a civil or 
criminal context.”171  Doing so, it reasoned, was “faithful to Morrison’s 
rationale,” which it understood as a desire to construct a stable 
background of interpretative rules against which Congress can 
legislate.172 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is also instructive, however, in 
illustrating the difficulty courts have sometimes encountered in 
determining a statute’s “focus” as Morrison directs them to do.  In the 
RICO context, there are two possible objects of congressional focus: the 
criminal enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity.  To see why 
this matters, consider the facts of Chao Fan Xu.  The defendants in that 
case were four Chinese nationals convicted under RICO for engaging in 
a scheme to defraud the Bank of China by diverting bank funds to a 
holding company in Hong Kong.173  The defendants subsequently used 
those funds “to speculate in foreign currency, to make fraudulent loans, 
to purchase real estate in Asia and North America, and to finance 
gambling trips to Las Vegas and other casino venues.”174  Though the 
fraud’s primary victim was a foreign bank and nearly all the fraudulent 
activity occurred overseas, the scheme’s success depended on each 
defendant’s decision to enter into a sham marriage with a U.S. citizen or 
Green Card holder.175  Doing so ultimately enabled them to evade 
Chinese law enforcement by fleeing to the United States.176 
In assessing whether the defendants’ conduct constituted a crime 
punishable under RICO, the Ninth Circuit noted post-Morrison 
disagreement among lower courts over whether RICO’s principal focus 
is on the criminal enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activity.177  
Ultimately, the court concluded that RICO’s focus was on the 
racketeering activity and not the criminal enterprise, and it accordingly 
upheld the convictions of the defendants.178  The court purported to 
 
170. Brief of the United States at 45–48, United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965 (9th 
 Cir. 2013) (09-10189). 
171. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 974–75. 
172. Id. at 974 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010)). 
173. Id. at 972. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 975–76. 
178. Id. at 979. 
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premise its decision on RICO’s text and Congress’ intent as expressed 
through the statute’s legislative history.  It noted for instance, that 
RICO’s statement of purpose indicated that the statute was intended to 
promote “the eradication of organized crime . . . by providing enhanced 
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those 
engaged in crime.”179  Consequently, the Court concluded, “it is highly 
unlikely that Congress was unconcerned with the actions of foreign 
enterprises where those actions violated the laws of this country while 
the defendants were in this country.”180 
While the Ninth Circuit asked the right question, its ultimate 
conclusion was erroneous.  The more compelling argument, as 
expressed by several district courts, is that RICO’s focus concerns 
criminal enterprises.181  That is because the reasoning of those courts 
mirrors that of Morrison, which noted that “§ 10(b) does not punish 
deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered.’”182  Similarly, RICO does 
not punish racketeering activity, “but only racketeering activity in 
connection with an ‘enterprise.’”183  It seems clear, then, that the 
criminal enterprise is “the object[] of the statute’s solicitude.”184  Or, as 
one district court has explained, “RICO . . . seeks to regulate 
‘enterprises’ by protecting them from being victimized by or conducted 
through racketeering activity.”185 
Ironically, the Ninth Circuit declined to define RICO’s focus as the 
criminal enterprise for largely functionalist reasons.  The irony lies in 
the court’s doing so while also claiming fidelity to Morrison, a decision 
that eschewed functionalist concerns for an approach grounded in 
textualist premises.  The Ninth Circuit’s primary objection to adopting 
the enterprise as the statute’s focus was its perception that 
“[d]etermining the geographic location of an enterprise—whether 
 
179. Id. at 978 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and 
 Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073 
(emphasis added)). 
180. Id. at 978. 
181. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 
938–40 (N.D. Cal. 2012); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-cv-5771, 2011 WL 
843957, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); Cedeno v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473–74 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
182. European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010)). 
183. Id. 
184. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
185. European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5. 
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foreign or domestic—is a difficult inquiry.”186  Specifically, the court 
objected to the “nerve center” test employed by many lower courts.187  
This test, which asks where the enterprise’s decisions are conceived 
rather than carried out, “could lead to ‘artificially simplified results.’”188  
For instance, if followed, the nerve center test would result in a 
domestic corporation being held liable under RICO whereas “[a] foreign 
corporation would be immune from prosecution simply because its 
ringleaders had the forethought to incorporate overseas.”189 
The court’s decision, of course, neglects the many reasons why 
Congress might have declined to give prosecutors the power to bring 
charges against those accused of hatching conspiracies abroad.  But it 
also bears repeating that under Morrison and Kiobel such functionalist 
concerns carry little weight.  As the Morrison Court made clear, “The 
results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what Congress 
would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—
demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against 
extraterritorially.”190  There is no evidence that Congress ever 
considered, let alone embraced, RICO’s potential application to foreign 
defendants whose criminal enterprise was concocted overseas in an 
effort to defraud a foreign bank, and whose illegal domestic conduct 
was largely incidental to that scheme’s success.  Rather than guess at 
what Congress would have preferred, “[a] more natural inquiry might be 
what . . . Congress in fact thought about and conferred.”191 
C. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
RICO and section 10(b) are both statutes that have criminal and civil 
components.  Such statutes must be read consistently regardless of their 
application.  But Morrison also embodies a general admonition to courts 
about how they should interpret all federal statutes.  Here, we consider 
Morrison’s application to a statute that has no civil corollary: 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c). 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) makes the possession or use of a gun during 
a “crime of violence” or drug trafficking crime a distinct offense.192  
 
186. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 2013). 
187. See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 
940–43 (N.D. Cal. 2012); European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6. 
188. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 977 (quoting Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 
940). 
189. Id. (citing Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
190. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010). 
191. Id. at 2880 (quoting Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)). 
192. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). 
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The statute provides prosecutors with a powerful tool because § 924(c) 
includes lengthy mandatory minimum sentences.193  For instance, a 
defendant convicted of possessing an assault rifle such as an AK-47 
faces a minimum prison sentence of thirty years upon conviction.194  
Consequently, prosecutors gain tremendous leverage in plea 
negotiations and the government is rarely put to its proof.  Instead, 
defendants typically choose to plead guilty to lesser charges or offer to 
cooperate in exchange for dismissal of the § 924(c) counts.195  And 
because the U.S. Attorney’s standard form plea agreement requires that 
defendants waive their right to appeal, the application of § 924(c) to 
foreign defendants is largely immunized from appellate review.196 
In a series of recent cases, foreign nationals arrested overseas have 
argued that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) does not reach extraterritorial weapons 
possession.  So far, that argument has failed to gain traction.197  A 
clearer articulation of the presumption’s applicability to criminal 
statutes by the Second Circuit in Vilar and Mandell, however, could 
change how district courts look at § 924(c).  The stakes for foreign 
nationals charged with violating U.S. laws could not be higher.  Put 
simply, in many instances it could mean the difference between 
pleading guilty or going to trial.  Under the law as it is currently 
interpreted, defendants simply cannot take the risk of incurring lengthy 
mandatory prison sentences. 
This Section begins with an analysis of § 924(c)’s text, history, and 
structure.  Congress enacted the statute as a response to the problem of 
increasing domestic gun violence in the 1960s, prompted in part by the 
assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.  Regardless of the 
significance one is inclined to attach to that history, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality ought to bar § 924(c)’s application abroad.  
Nowhere does the statute’s ambiguous text evince a “clear indication” 
that Congress intended for it to punish the use or possession of a firearm 
 
193. Id. §924(c)(1)(A)–(C) (authorizing mandatory minimums of five to thirty years). 
194. Id. 
195. The DOJ is explicit about its policy.  See 9 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 112 
(1997) (“Firearms violations should be aggressively used in prosecuting violent crime.  They are 
generally simple and quick to prove.  The mandatory and enhanced punishments for many 
firearms violations can be used as leverage to gain plea bargaining and cooperation from 
offenders.”). 
196. On the issue of appeal waivers, see generally Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, 
Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209 (2005) (analyzing the 
details, benefits, costs, and ethics behind many forms of appeal waivers). 
197. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012) (explicitly rejecting 
this argument); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 814 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); United States 
v. Ahmed, No. 10-cr-131, 2012 WL 983545, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (same); United 
States v. Mardirossian, 818 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same). 
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overseas. 
Next, this Section considers the various rationales lower courts have 
fashioned for extending § 924(c)’s reach.  None of these rationales is 
persuasive.  For instance, several courts have adopted a plain meaning 
approach towards the statute by misinterpreting Bowman to exempt all 
criminal laws from the presumption.  More plausibly, some courts have 
analogized § 924(c) to crimes like conspiracy, reasoning that the statute 
is merely an ancillary one whose scope Congress intended courts to 
derive from underlying predicate crimes.  As this Section explains, that 
analogy is unpersuasive for several reasons, not the least of which is 
that § 924(c) is not merely a penalty enhancement that punishes the 
manner of committing a crime, but a substantive offense in its own right 
that prohibits a specific kind of conduct. 
1. Applying the Presumption to § 924(c) 
It is easy to see why a court, when presented with § 924(c)’s 
seemingly straightforward text, would fail to discern a problem with 
applying the statute abroad.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides in relevant 
part: 
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or 
drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a 
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in 
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall . . . [listing 
penalties].198 
The statute consists of two basic elements: (i) using, carrying, or 
possessing a firearm; (ii) during, in relation, or in furtherance of certain 
enumerated drug and violent crimes that “may be prosecuted in a court 
of the United States.”  As one court has noted, “[o]n its face, there is 
simply no limitation in the language of the statute concerning its 
application to crimes committed outside of the United States.”199  And 
because U.S. law prohibits certain drug trafficking offenses and crimes 
of violence that occur abroad,200 a fact of which Congress was 
presumably aware at the time it enacted (or amended) the statute, § 
924(c) would seem to penalize the extraterritorial possession or use of 
firearms in certain specified instances.  Or so the argument goes. 
That argument, however, entirely disregards the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.  Upon applying that canon, the import of the text 
 
198. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
199. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 814. 
200. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 81 (arson); id. § 1111 (murder); id. § 1201 (kidnapping); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 959 (2012) (illicit drug importation); id. § 960a (narco-terrorism); 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70507 
(2012) (drugs aboard vessels). 
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becomes much less clear.  To begin, consider the statute’s first term, 
“any person.”  As the Supreme Court has noted, it is not always proper 
to give the term “any” its literal meaning.  For instance, “In ordinary 
life, a speaker who says, ‘I’ll see any film,’ may or may not mean to 
include films shown in another city.”201  Likewise, “In law, a legislature 
that uses the statutory phrase ‘any person’ may or may not mean to 
include ‘persons’ outside the jurisdiction of the state.”202  And while 
“[t]he words ‘any person or persons,’ are broad enough to comprehend 
every human being” those words “must not only be limited to cases 
within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the 
legislature intended to apply them.”203  That is how the Supreme Court 
has in fact interpreted federal criminal laws since at least 1818 when it 
declined to find statutory authority for the prosecution of a foreign 
national for robbery on the high seas.204  As Morrison and Kiobel 
underscore, absent a “clear indication” by Congress otherwise, federal 
statutes do not have extraterritorial effect.205 
While it is true that the Supreme Court has interpreted the word 
“any” broadly when considering the domestic application of a separate 
§ 924(c) provision,206 it has repeatedly cautioned lower courts against 
doing the same when determining the extraterritorial scope of federal 
statutes.  In Foley Brothers v. Filardo, for example, the Court rejected 
the plaintiff’s attempt to sue for labor violations abroad under an act 
providing that “[e]very contract made to which the United States . . . is a 
party . . . shall contain a provision that no laborer . . . shall be required 
or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day.”207  
The Court did so based on the “normal” assumption that Congress is 
 
201. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005). 
202. Id. 
203. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818). 
204. Id. 
205. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013) (quoting Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010)). 
206. United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1997).  In Gonzales, the Court was tasked 
with interpreting the following § 924(c) language: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a 
violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run 
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment . . . .”  Defendant plausibly claimed that 
Congress intended the phrase “any other term of imprisonment” to refer only to federal sentences.  
Justice O’Connor, writing on behalf of the majority, disagreed.  She noted that “[r]ead naturally, 
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning,” and because “Congress did not add any language 
limiting the breadth of that word,” the Court “must read § 924(c) as referring to all ‘term[s] of 
imprisonment,’ including those imposed by state courts.”  Id. at 5. 
207. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 324 (repealed 
1962)). 
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“primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”208  Reviewing the 
legislative history, the Court found that the “insertion of the word 
‘every’ was designed to remedy a misinterpretation according to which 
the Act did not apply to work performed on private property by 
government contractors.”209  In contrast, “[n]othing . . . support[ed] the 
conclusion . . . that ‘every contract’ must of necessity, by virtue of the 
broadness of the language, include contracts for work to be performed 
in foreign countries.”210 
The table below demonstrates the Court’s longstanding practice of 
invoking the presumption to considerably narrow similarly broad 
language.  The examples cited therein, while not exhaustive, suffice to 
show that general terms predictably lose their expansive meaning when 
the presumption is properly applied. 
 
Case Statutory Language Interpretation 
United States v. 
Palmer, 16 U.S. 
610 (1818) 
[I]f any person or persons shall commit, 
upon the high seas . . . murder or robbery, or 
any other offence, which, if committed 
within the body of a county, would, by the 
laws of the United States, be punishable 
with death . . . every such offender shall be 
deemed, taken, and adjudged to be a pirate 
and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall 
suffer death . . . . 
Held not to apply 
to foreign 
nationals 
committing 
robbery on the 
high seas aboard 
foreign vessels  
Sandberg v. 
McDonald, 248 
U.S. 185 (1918) 
That it shall be . . . unlawful in any case to 
pay any seaman wages in advance of the 
time when he has actually earned the same. 
Held not to apply 
to foreign seamen 
Foley Bros. v. 
Filardo, 336 
U.S. 281 (1949) 
Every contract made to which the United 
States . . . is a party . . . shall contain a 
provision that no laborer or mechanic doing 
any part of the work contemplated by the 
contract, in the employ of the contractor or 
any subcontractor . . . shall be required or 
permitted to work more than eight hours in 
any one calendar day upon such work . . . .  
Held not to apply 
to contracts 
between federal 
government and 
private 
contractors 
abroad 
 
208. Id. at 285. 
209. Id. at 287. 
210. Id. 
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EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244 (1991) 
The term “industry affecting commerce” 
means any activity, business, or industry in 
commerce or in which a labor dispute would 
hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow 
of commerce . . . .   
Held not to apply 
to foreign 
corporations 
operating abroad  
Sale v. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 
155 (1993) 
The Attorney General shall not deport or 
return any alien . . . to a country if the 
Attorney General determines that such 
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened 
in such country on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular 
group, or political opinion.  
Held not to apply 
to aliens detained 
in international 
waters while 
attempting to 
enter U.S. 
territory 
Small v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 
385 (2005) 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who 
has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess . . . 
any firearm. 
Held not to apply 
to convictions in 
foreign courts 
Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. 
Bank, 130 S. 
Ct. 2869 (2010) 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so 
registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the [Securities 
and Exchange] Commission may 
prescribe . . . . 
Held not to apply 
to securities 
issued on foreign 
exchanges 
Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013) 
The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States. 
Held not to allow 
civil actions for 
torts committed 
abroad 
 
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to specifically consider 
whether § 924(c) encompasses extraterritorial conduct.  But its 
interpretation of the substantive reach of a parallel provision is highly 
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instructive.  In Small v. United States, the petitioner, Gary Small, 
appealed his conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the so-
called felon-in-possession statute.211  Section 922(g), which, like § 
924(c), was passed as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, makes it a 
crime for “any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a 
crime publishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . 
to . . . possess . . . any firearm.”212  Small, whose predicate conviction 
was for attempting to illegally smuggle several firearms into Japan, had 
been sentenced by a Japanese court to five years’ imprisonment.213  
When he returned to the United States, he purchased a gun from a 
Pennsylvania firearms dealer, which was recovered during a routine 
parole search.214  Small eventually entered a conditional guilty plea 
while preserving his right to challenge the conviction.215 
Strictly speaking, Small did not involve a question of extraterritorial 
application of federal law at all.  As the dissent protested, “In 
prosecuting Small, the Government [was] enforcing a domestic criminal 
statute to punish domestic criminal conduct.”216  The government had 
similarly argued in its brief that the “presumption . . . has no application 
here” since “922(g)(1) does not regulate conduct on foreign 
territory.”217  But the majority believed the principles behind the 
presumption were nonetheless relevant, particularly the notion that 
“Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”218  In 
light of this “commonsense notion,” the Court declined to read the 
phrase “convicted in any court” to encompass foreign convictions.219 
Although Small produced a five-three split, of particular significance 
is the majority’s uncontroverted assertion that although the presumption 
did not apply “directly” to Small’s case, it “would apply . . . were [the 
Court] to consider whether this statute prohibits unlawful gun 
possession abroad as well as domestically.”220  That language is more 
than mere dicta.  It is a conclusion both consistent with the text of the 
dissent, which acknowledged that the presumption operates to “restrict 
federal statutes from applying outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
 
211. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005). 
212. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). 
213. Small, 544 U.S. at 387. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
217. Brief for Respondent at 44 n.31, Small, 544 U.S. 385 (No. 03-750). 
218. Small, 544 U.S. at 388 (majority opinion) (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 
203 (1993)). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 389. 
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United States,”221 and consistent with the identities of the dissent’s 
signatories, a group that included Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Kennedy, all three of whom subscribed to the Morrison and Kiobel 
majority opinions. 
It seems likely, then, that a majority of the Court, and quite possibly a 
unanimous majority, would view the felon-in-possession statute as 
applying to domestic possession only.  That is significant because it, 
like § 924(c), depends on the commission of a predicate crime.  But 
assumptions as to how the Court would rule if faced with determining 
the extraterritorial application of the felon-in-possession statute, while 
instructive, cannot resolve whether § 924(c) applies to a person who 
uses or possesses a gun overseas.  That is because § 924(c)’s reference 
to “any person” is qualified by the language that follows, i.e. “for which 
the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.”  In other 
words, Congress appears to have been quite specific in identifying the 
class of individuals whom it sought to punish. 
That Congress intended to punish those who carry or use a weapon 
during the commission of a federal (as opposed to state) crime, 
however, says nothing about whether Congress meant for the law to 
apply outside the United States.  To put it in Morrison’s and Kiobel’s 
terms, there is no “affirmative indication” that the statute applies 
extraterritorially.222  It is at this point that Morrison and Kiobel provide 
an opening to consider “context,” by which the Court presumably 
means a statute’s history, structure, and purpose.223 
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as part of the Gun Control Act 
of 1968 in the wake of the Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. 
Kennedy assassinations.224  According to the report of the House 
conference committee, Congress’s primary purpose in passing the Act 
was to “respond[] to widespread national concern that existing Federal 
control over the sale and shipment of firearms [across] State lines [was] 
grossly inadequate.”225  To this end, the title of the Act was “An act to 
amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for better control of the 
interstate traffic in firearms” and section 1 specifically provided for 
 
221. Id. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
222. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“For us to run 
interference in . . . a delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative 
intention of the Congress clearly expressed.” (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 
353 U. S. 138, 147 (1957) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010). 
223. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
224. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 942(c) (2012)). 
225. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 1047 (1968) (Conf. Rep.) (brackets in original), reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4413. 
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“State Firearms Control Assistance.”226 
The Senate Report offers further confirmation of domestic gun 
violence as the “object[] of the statute’s solicitude.”227  The report noted 
that, “[i]n 1967, 7,700 citizens were murdered by gunmen in the United 
States, and 71,000 Americans were victims of armed robberies and 
55,000 persons were assaulted by means of firearms.  Thus, in 1967, 
134,000 American citizens were victimized by gun violence in the 
United States.”228  The Senate report did not include any mention of 
Americans harmed overseas.  Even the sponsor of the most recent 
amendment to § 924(c), enacted in 1998, boasted that the amendment’s 
passage represented “an important step in the battle against firearm 
violence in America.”229 
The language of § 924(c) as originally enacted applied to an even 
broader category of criminal activity than it does today.  Rather than 
prohibiting the use of weapons in connection with certain kinds of 
felonies, i.e. enumerated drug offenses and crimes of violence, the 
statute simply punished whoever “use[d] a firearm to commit any felony 
which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.”230 
To understand why Congress adopted this particular statutory 
formulation, some historical context is necessary.  Section 924(c) was 
not included in the original Gun Control bill, but was instead introduced 
as an amendment on the House floor by Representative Robert Casey of 
Texas.  Casey’s original amendment would have punished “whoever 
during the commission of any robbery, assault, murder, rape, burglary, 
kidnapping, or homicide (other than involuntary manslaughter), uses or 
carries any firearm which has been transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce . . . .”231  Had it passed, Casey’s amendment would have 
dramatically expanded the federal government’s intrusion into matters 
traditionally entrusted to states as part of their general police power.  
That concern is what prompted Representative Richard Poff of Virginia 
to suggest a much narrower alternative amendment, which applied to 
“whoever uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted 
in a court of the United States.”232  As Poff explained when introducing 
 
226. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968). 
227. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
228. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968) (emphasis added), available at 
https://bulk.resource.org/gao/90-618/000051AF.pdf. 
229. 144 CONG. REC. 1715 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum) (emphasis added). 
230. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1224 (1968) (emphasis 
added). 
231. H.R. 18298, 90th Cong. (1968). 
232. This became the eventual language of the statute.  Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 
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his revised language: 
[A]s a matter of policy, I do not think I would be wise to convert State 
crimes into Federal crimes on such a massive scale.  The Constitution 
reserves the police powers to the several States.  What is at issue is the 
proper function of the federal system.  What is at stake is the concept 
of dual sovereignties.  What is involved is the danger of centralized 
police powers.233 
Consequently, the phrase “may be prosecuted in a court of the United 
States” was inserted in order to differentiate federal from state crimes.  
The ensuing debate makes clear that other members shared Poff’s 
concern.234  In contrast, there is absolutely no hint in the legislative 
record that Congress even considered § 924(c)’s potential 
extraterritorial application, nor would they have thought to since the 
number of federal crimes that had been applied extraterritorially at the 
time was miniscule. 
The point can be put slightly differently: suppose Representative 
Casey’s original amendment had passed, making it a crime to use a 
firearm during one of the enumerated felonies so long as that firearm 
had been transported in interstate or foreign commerce.  Such a statute 
clearly would not apply to the use of a firearm extraterritorially.  That is 
because the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that even statutes that 
contain broad language in their definitions of ‘commerce’ that expressly 
refer to ‘foreign commerce’ do not apply abroad.”235  If this is correct, it 
would require a leap of logic to infer that Representative Hoff’s 
substitute amendment, introduced for the sole purpose of cabining the 
statute’s scope by differentiating federal from state crimes, in fact 
expanded the substantive reach of the statute to encompass acts 
committed abroad. 
One final point concerning the phrase “may be prosecuted in a court 
of the United States” bears mentioning.  The same language appears in 
other sections of the U.S. Criminal Code.  For instance, the phrase 
appears in 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b), which concerns sentences of probation 
for domestic violence offenders.  The relevant provision reads: “A 
defendant who has been convicted for the first time of a domestic 
violence crime shall be sentenced to a term or probation if not sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment.  The term ‘domestic violence crime’ means a 
 
1213, 1224 (Oct. 22, 1968). 
233. 114 CONG. REC. 22, 231–32 (1968) (statement of Rep. Richard Poff). 
234. Id. at 22, 231. 
235. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991) (emphasis in original) (citing 
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925)); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de 
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
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crime for which the defendant may be prosecuted in a court of the 
United States . . . .”236  There is some support for the idea, then, that the 
phrase is mere “boilerplate language” that should not be read to expand 
the substantive reach of the statute.237   
The existence of these other statutes and the legislative history of § 
924(c) suggest that the operative language is jurisdictional in nature.  
That is to say, it defines federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.  
Wherever the predicate offenses are enumerated felonies, a federal court 
necessarily enjoys jurisdiction over the “case,” including the authority 
to decide whether the conduct at issue is punishable under § 924(c).  
But acknowledging this truth says nothing of the extraterritorial scope 
of § 924(c) itself.  As Morrison recognized, “to ask what conduct [a 
statute] reaches is to ask what conduct [it] prohibits.  Subject-matter 
jurisdiction, by contrast, refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”238  
Seen in this light, the “for which a person may be prosecuted” language 
merely recognizes federal courts’ jurisdiction over the “case.”  It does 
not speak to conduct that the statute prohibits. 
Finally, the conclusion that Congress did not intend § 924(c) to apply 
extraterritorially is buttressed by a general review of the statute’s 
overall structure.  As the Court found in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 
with respect to Title VII, “[t]he statute as a whole indicates a concern 
that it not unduly interfere with the sovereignty and laws of the 
States.”239  Other provisions make clear that Congress was primarily 
concerned with firearms transportation to and between States.  
 For example, while the Gun Control Act reflects congressional 
concern over potential conflicts between federal and state law, the 
statute is silent as to the relationship between federal and foreign law.  
Section 924(i) penalizes violations of § 922(u), which prohibits thefts 
from the inventory of gun dealers, manufacturers, and importers.  
Section 924(i)(2) notes that  
[n]othing contained in this subsection shall be construed as indicating 
an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which 
provisions of this subsection operate to the exclusion of State laws on 
the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this subsection be 
construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such 
provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this 
subsection.240  
 
236. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
237. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 251. 
238. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
239. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 255. 
240. 18 U.S.C. § 924(i)(2). 
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Congress presumably would have at least mentioned potential conflicts 
with the laws of foreign countries had it considered § 924(c)’s potential 
extraterritorial application.  In fact, there is an entire section of the Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 927, devoted to its “Effect on State Law.”241  The Arabian 
American Oil Court made a similar point, noting that “[i]t is . . . 
reasonable to conclude that had Congress intended Title VII to apply 
overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign 
laws and procedures.”242 
Many of the penalty provisions of § 924 were drafted in such a way 
as to foreclose the possibility of extraterritorial application.  Section 
924(g), for instance, prohibits the act of acquiring a weapon for use in a 
crime of violence.  Significantly, however, the statute’s literal terms do 
not authorize conviction for someone who travels for the purpose of 
acquiring a weapon outside of the United States.  It reads: 
Whoever, with the intent to engage in conduct which . . . (4) 
constitutes a crime of violence . . . travels from any State or foreign 
country into any other State and acquires . . . a firearm in such other 
State in furtherance of such purpose, shall be imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both.243   
If Congress had intended § 924 to apply extraterritorially, presumably 
it would have eliminated the locus language altogether or substituted 
“into any other foreign country” for “into any other State.”  Instead, 
Congress was sensibly focused on violence in the United States.  
Section 924(k) similarly penalizes the act of smuggling a weapon into 
the United States for the purpose of committing a crime of violence; it 
does not criminalize smuggling a weapon out of the U.S. for the 
purpose of committing a crime of violence abroad.244  Finally, § 922 
describes several “unlawful acts” under the Gun Control Act—
importation, exportation, unlicensed disposal, and possession—with no 
mention of extraterritorial application.245 
Before moving on to an analysis of how courts have addressed § 
924(c)’s extraterritorial reach, a final point bears mentioning.  One 
might be tempted to suppose that the subject matter of § 924(c) offers 
the requisite “context” to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.  After all, drug trafficking offenses frequently involve 
extraterritorial conduct.  It is not implausible therefore that Congress 
was thinking extraterritorially when it added “drug trafficking” to the 
 
241. Id. § 927. 
242. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 256. 
243. 18 U.S.C. § 924(g) (emphasis added). 
244. Id. § 924(k). 
245. See generally id. § 922. 
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statute in 1986.246  But this argument proves too much.  It is not enough 
to say that the crime at issue often involves extraterritorial conduct.  
There must be some “affirmative indication” that such conduct was the 
object of Congress’s concern.  The legislative history of the 1986 
amendment provides no such indication. 
2. The Unwarranted Expansion of § 924(c) 
To date, only two appeals courts have addressed § 924(c)’s 
extraterritorial application.247  Both have determined that the statute 
prohibits firearms offenses committed abroad.  The justifications for 
these holdings, however, are seriously flawed. 
In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the convictions of Roy 
Belfast.  Belfast, the American son of former Liberian president Charles 
Taylor, was the first person to be indicted and convicted under the 
Torture Act.248  At trial, the government proved that Belfast had 
participated in and directed a number of atrocities during his father’s 
presidency, including multiple murders.  In addition to being convicted 
of acts of torture, Belfast was found guilty of violating § 924(c).  All of 
the charged conduct, including Belfast’s use of a weapon, occurred 
entirely in Liberia. 
In addressing Belfast’s argument that § 924(c) does not proscribe 
extraterritorial conduct, the Eleventh Circuit postulated that 
“extraterritorial application can be inferred in certain cases even absent 
an express intention on the face of the statute.”249  For this proposition 
the court cited Bowman.  The court further explained its interpretation 
of Bowman’s meaning: 
Crimes fall under the Bowman exception when limiting their locus to 
the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope 
and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for 
frauds as easily committed by citizens in foreign countries as at home.  
Thus, we have upheld extraterritorial application of statutes where the 
nature of the activities warranted a broad sweep of power.250 
As is true with section 10(b) and RICO, the court of appeals’ reading 
of Bowman would effectively extraterritorialize the entire U.S. Criminal 
Code.  That is not what Bowman says, of course, nor does it reflect 
 
246. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2), 100 Stat. 449, 456–57 (1986) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 
921 (2012)). 
247. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Belfast, 611 
F.3d 783, 814 (11th Cir. 2010). 
248. 18 U.S.C. § 2340–2340A. 
249. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 813 (quoting United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 
2010)). 
250. Id. at 814 (quoting Frank, 599 F.3d at 1230). 
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Congress’s clearly expressed intent.  As one district court correctly 
noted in rejecting a similarly expansive interpretation offered by the 
government, “§ 924(c) criminalizes conduct that does not directly 
victimize the United States.  All crime can harm the United States 
indirectly, but it does not follow that all federal criminal statutes apply 
extraterritorially based on the Government’s need to ‘defend itself.’”251 
The Eleventh Circuit went on to note that “the plain language of § 
924(c) demonstrates that Congress intended the provision to apply to 
any acts that, under other legislation, may be prosecuted in federal 
courts.”252  Of course, this “plain language” approach ignores both the 
presumption and the legislative history that demonstrates Congress’s 
overriding concern was to differentiate federal from state crimes. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of § 924(c) is particularly 
perplexing given the court’s acknowledgement of Morrison with respect 
to the Torture Act, a statute whose extraterritorial application is, as the 
court itself recognized, “unmistakable.”  After all, the Torture Act 
applies to “[w]hoever outside the United States . . . commits torture.”253  
But while playing lip service to the idea that the presumption applied to 
§ 924(c), the court in fact bypassed Morrison’s teaching in favor of an 
unjustifiably broad reading of Bowman. 
Recently, the Second Circuit became the second court of appeals to 
consider § 924(c)’s extraterritorial reach.254  “Consider,” however, may 
be too generous a characterization of the court’s treatment of the issue.  
Defendant-Appellant Aafia Siddiqui was convicted of attempted murder 
of U.S. nationals for firing an American serviceman’s M-4 at military 
personnel while detained at a local police facility in Afghanistan.255  In 
reviewing her appeal, the court gave short shrift to the argument that § 
924(c) does not apply abroad: 
As for § 924, which criminalizes the use of a firearm during 
commission of a crime of violence, every federal court that has 
considered the issue has given the statute extraterritorial application 
where, as here, the underlying substantive criminal statutes apply 
extraterritorially.  We see no reason to quarrel with their 
conclusions.256 
Significantly, the court’s reasoning was premised on its misguided 
 
251. United States v. Mardirossian, 818 F. Supp. 2d 775, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation 
omitted). 
252. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 814. 
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (emphasis added). 
254. United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 2012). 
255. Id. at 696–97. 
256. Id. at 701. 
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belief that “[t]he ordinary presumption that laws do not apply 
extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes.”257 
Every district court that has considered the issue has similarly found 
that § 924(c) applies extraterritorially.  But they have not generally 
followed the Second Circuit’s implausible contention that the 
presumption simply does not apply to criminal statutes as a class.  
Instead, they have relied on an alternative theory, namely that § 924(c) 
is an “ancillary” statute whose reach is determined by the scope of its 
underlying predicates.  In this regard, Judge Rakoff’s opinion in United 
States v. Mardirossian, a case that we litigated, is instructive. 
Judge Rakoff’s determination that § 924(c) is an ancillary statute 
whose reach is coterminous with the underlying drug trafficking 
offenses or crimes of violence enumerated therein is erroneous for at 
least three reasons.  First, there is no controlling precedent supporting 
the use of an “ancillary statute” theory as a separate basis for defeating 
the ordinary presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes.  
In this way, the district court placed undue emphasis on United States v. 
Yousef,258 a Second Circuit case that upheld the application of a 
conspiracy statute to defendants accused of plotting to blow up 
commercial aircraft.  In Yousef, the court noted that “if Congress 
intended United States courts to have jurisdiction over the substantive 
crime of placing bombs on board the aircraft at issue, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Congress also intended to vest in United States courts the 
requisite jurisdiction over an extraterritorial conspiracy to commit that 
crime.”259  The Morrison court made clear, however, that the 
extraterritorial inquiry is a “merits” issue rather than a jurisdictional 
one.260  Hence, while commission of an enumerated drug trafficking 
offense or crime of violence empowers a court to hear a “case,” it says 
nothing of whether Congress intended § 924(c) to reach extraterritorial 
weapons possession.  Moreover, both the conspiracy statute, which 
speaks of “persons [who] conspire either to commit any offense against 
the United States, or to defraud the United States,”261 and the 
substantive offenses charged in Yousef are, unlike § 924(c), subject to 
the Bowman exception. 
Second, the court’s analogy to conspiracy law is inapt.  Section 
924(c) is not functionally equivalent to solicitation, conspiracy, attempt, 
 
257. Id. at 700. 
258. 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). 
259. Id. at 87–88. 
260. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
261. 18 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). 
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or any other inchoate offense that derives its substantive scope from an 
underlying offense.  As the Supreme Court has noted, § 924(c) is not 
merely a penalty or a manner of committing a crime, but rather a crime 
in its own right that punishes certain conduct, namely carrying or using 
a weapon during a violent crime or drug trafficking offense.262 
Third, the court’s analysis illustrates a broader point about how lower 
courts view civil and criminal statutes differently when determining a 
statute’s extraterritorial application.  In Mardirossian, the court 
accepted the government’s argument that, because the predicate crimes 
of violence and drug trafficking had explicit extraterritorial application, 
§ 924(c) must likewise apply to extraterritorial conduct.  But just a year 
earlier, Judge Rakoff had rejected a similar argument when offered by 
civil plaintiffs.  In that case, the court explained: 
Plaintiffs’ superficial argument—that since the federal statutes 
prohibiting money laundering are (they say) extraterritorial in nature, a 
RICO action predicated on violations of those statutes should be given 
extraterritorial application—entirely misapprehends both the teachings 
of Morrison and the nature of RICO. . . . [T]he focus of RICO is on 
the enterprise as the recipient of, or cover for, a pattern of criminal 
activity.  If, as noted above, RICO evidences no concern with foreign 
enterprises, RICO does not apply where, as here, the alleged enterprise 
and the impact of the predicate activity upon it are entirely foreign.263 
Judge Rakoff’s analysis of RICO is undoubtedly correct.  But his 
reasoning is likewise applicable to § 924(c), a statute whose “focus” is 
to penalize the possession and use of guns, presumably because in 
Congress’s estimation such possession and use makes the commission 
of the underlying criminal offenses more dangerous.  It makes sense for 
Congress to be primarily concerned with protecting inhabitants of the 
territorial United States from domestic gun violence.  Indeed, to the 
extent that it is relevant, the legislative history suggests this was 
precisely Congress’s focus when it enacted the law.264  Nevertheless, 
courts appear reluctant to confine prosecutors’ power to bring such 
charges in international cases. 
 
262. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 10 (1978) (holding that § 924(c) “creates an 
offense distinct from the underlying federal felony”); see also Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 
120, 125 (2000) (“Congress already has determined that at least some portion of § 924, including 
§ 924(c) itself, creates, not penalty enhancements, but entirely new crimes.  See S. REP. NO. 98-
225, at 312–314 (1984) (“Section 924(c) sets out an offense distinct from the underlying felony 
and is not simply a penalty provision.”)). 
263. Cedeno v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Cedeno v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2012). 
264. See supra notes 224–33 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article cannot hope to capture the myriad ways Morrison might 
be invoked by criminal defendants going forward.  Instead, we have 
sought to illustrate by way of example how lower courts should 
approach statutory interpretation in this area generally.  Remaining 
faithful to Morrison’s holding requires courts to ask whether a statute 
evidences Congress’s considered judgment that extraterritorial 
application of the statute is warranted.  As we have argued, courts ought 
not focus on whether such applications are wise policy because those 
are determinations appropriately entrusted to the political braches.  But 
in a time when U.S. law enforcement agencies are increasingly asserting 
their power overseas,265 it is incumbent upon courts to insist that 
Congress speak with clarity and that the Executive operate within the 
boundaries of clearly established law.  
 
265. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, A New York Prosecutor with Worldwide Reach, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 2011, at A1 (discussing international sting operations). 
